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ABSTRACT 
The United States government’s role in preparing for, preventing, responding to, and 
recovering from all domestic disasters is coordinated by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). Further, FEMA is designated as the primary agency 
responsible for coordinating Structural Collapse (Urban) Search and Rescue (US&R) 
situations in the National Response Framework. Since the inception of FEMA resources 
intended for response to US&R missions, the national search and rescue system has 
evolved, along with the numbers and types of other resources available to assist in US&R 
missions. Nonetheless, a disconnect remains, with no common national US&R strategy 
that effectively brings together available federal resources from FEMA, the Department 
of Defense, and other partner agencies. FEMA states that urban search and rescue is 
considered a “multi-hazard” discipline, as the teams can hypothetically be utilized for 
response to a wide variety of natural and man-made emergencies or disasters. Although 
the present FEMA US&R task force model has worked well for certain types of disasters, 
this thesis explores responses to past events and considers a new strategy that could allow 
the US&R teams to be used more effectively and efficiently in an evolving Homeland 
Security enterprise. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This initial chapter is intended to provide the reader with a broad overview of the 
national urban search and rescue system—beyond the local and state level—and also to 
identify key guidance documents and policies related to federal disaster declarations, 
disaster response, and search and rescue. Additionally, this chapter covers the research 
questions and the methodology employed in this process. 
The United States government’s role in “preparing for, preventing, mitigating the 
effects of, responding to, and recovering from all domestic disasters, whether natural or 
man-made, including acts of terror,” is coordinated by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.1  Further, the National Response Framework (NRF)—in the search 
and rescue annex—identifies the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as 
the primary agency designated for Structural Collapse (Urban) Search and Rescue 
(US&R) situations.2  Since the inception of specific FEMA resources intended for 
response to US&R missions, the search and rescue enterprise has evolved, along with the 
numbers and types of other resources available to assist in US&R missions. Nonetheless, 
there still seems to be a disconnect, with no common national US&R strategy that 
effectively brings together available resources from FEMA, the National Guard, the 
Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the Department of Interior. 
According to a Presidential Policy Directive issued in 2011,  
The national preparedness system shall be designed to help guide the 
domestic efforts of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit 
sectors, and the public to build and sustain the capabilities outlined in the 
national preparedness goal. The national preparedness system shall 
                                                 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA History.”   
2 National Response Framework, Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9—Search and Rescue. 
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include guidance for planning, organization, equipment, training, and 
exercises to build and maintain domestic capabilities.3   
This reflects an understanding at the highest levels of government that not only should we 
plan and prepare for catastrophic events, but that we most organize, equip, train and 
exercise the system if we truly hope to be prepared. FEMA was originally created when, 
in 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order merging many of the separate 
disaster-related responsibilities into one organization, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). In the years leading up to this reorganization, many 
government agencies were still involved in disaster relief; in some cases, more than 100 
separate agencies were sometimes competing for control and jurisdiction of a disaster. 
Among other agencies, FEMA absorbed the Federal Insurance Administration, the 
National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service 
Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General 
Services Administration, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration activities 
from HUD. The Defense Department’s Defense Civil Preparedness Agency also 
relinquished civil defense responsibilities when those duties were also transferred to the 
new FEMA agency. 4   
The system in place today, by which a presidential disaster declaration of an 
emergency triggers financial and physical assistance through FEMA, is the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). The Stafford Act 
is a United States federal law designed to create an orderly structure and system of 
federal natural disaster assistance for state and local governments in carrying out their 
responsibilities in response and recovery during a disaster. When the law was created, the 
U.S. Congress had the intention, among other things, of encouraging states and localities 
to develop “comprehensive disaster preparedness plans, and to prepare for better 
intergovernmental coordination in the face of a disaster.”  The original Stafford Act is a 
1988 amended version of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. In October 1994, the Stafford 
Act was amended to incorporate most of the former Civil Defense Act of 1950, and the 
                                                 
3 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8), National Preparedness, The White House (March 30, 2011), 2. 
4 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA History.” 
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current version was last amended in 2007. Ultimately, the Act gives FEMA the 
responsibility for coordinating much of our national disaster response, and government-
wide relief efforts. In facilitating “intergovernmental coordination” during a disaster, the 
Stafford Act gives FEMA a mechanism for reimbursing disparate federal agencies that 
may be involved in disaster efforts—including agencies that could, potentially, directly 
support FEMA in carrying out US&R missions.5 
Since FEMA was created, the organization has undergone some transformation. 
Our current national preparedness system is founded in the United States National 
Strategy for Homeland Security. This strategy document was a formal government 
response to the events of September 11, 2001, at the Pentagon and World Trade Center. 
The document issued by President George W. Bush in July of 2002—and subsequent 
updates—outlines the overall strategic considerations for cooperation between the federal 
government, states, local entities, and private citizens in anticipating natural disasters, 
future terrorist attacks, and other potential incidents of national significance.6  Also as a 
result of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, Congress passed the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, which created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in an effort to 
better coordinate among the different federal agencies that deal with law enforcement, 
disaster preparedness and recovery, border protection and civil defense. In March of 
2003, FEMA was part of 22 federal agencies, programs and offices absorbed into DHS.7 
Approximately two years after becoming part of DHS, FEMA received intense 
criticism for its response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster in August 2005, and this event 
resulted in significant changes once again to our national preparedness system. On 
October 4, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Reform Act.  This act established a new vision and the mission of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security. The act also 
significantly reorganized FEMA, provided it substantial new authority to remedy gaps 
                                                 
5 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act, as amended, and Related Authorities” (June 2007).   
6 National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security (July 2002), vii. 
7 Department of Homeland Security, “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security.”  
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that became apparent in the response to Hurricane Katrina in August 2005—the most 
devastating natural disaster in U.S. history—and included a more robust preparedness 
mission for FEMA.8  Among the many problems and gaps identified were military force 
integration problems, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts,9 and a lack of clear and 
coherent command arrangements between federal agencies.10  The research for this paper 
seeks to identify progress made within the military and FEMA to reconcile these issues, 
and will explore additional options to improve US&R response. 
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a cabinet 
department of the United States federal government with the primary 
responsibilities of protecting the United States of America and U.S. 
Territories from and responding to terrorist attacks, man-made accidents, 
and natural disasters. Where the Department of Defense (DoD) is charged 
with military actions abroad, DHS works in the civilian sphere to protect 
the United States—generally to prepare for, prevent, and respond to 
domestic emergencies, including terrorism—within our borders.11   
One of the early the mechanisms for coordinating delivery of federal assistance 
and resources to supplement efforts of state and local governments overwhelmed by a 
major disaster or emergency was the Federal Response Plan (FRP) of 1999. This was a 
signed agreement among multiple federal departments and other agencies, including the 
American Red Cross.  
                                                 
8 U.S. General Accounting Office, Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006, GAO-09-59R, 10. 
9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Hurricane Katrina, Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 
Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO Report GAO-06-643 (Washington: May 
2006), 2. 
10 William Carwile, “Unified Command and the State-Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina in 
Mississippi,” Homeland Security Affairs Journal I, no. 2, 2005. 
11 Defense Study and Report to Congress, “DoD Role in Homeland Security” (July 2003), 3–4. 
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Table 1.   Primary and support agencies 
 
As reflected in Table 1, from the FRP document, the FRP delineated Emergency 
Support Functions (ESF) and designated agencies in either a primary or support role for 
each ESF. Even in this early document, FEMA was designated as the primary for US&R  
(ESF-9) and DoD was categorized as being available in a support role, although there is 
little evidence to indicate that DoD assets have been utilized in past disasters for US&R 
missions.12 
                                                 
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Response Plan (April 1999), 14. 
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The next iteration of a response plan was created in the National Response Plan 
(NRP) in December 2004. Through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, the 
president directed the development of a new National Response Plan (NRP) to better 
coordinate federal response structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all 
discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management.13   The NRP was 
built on the template of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which was 
intended to provide a consistent “doctrinal framework” for incident management at all 
jurisdictional levels—regardless of the size or complexity of the incident.14 The ESFs are 
also delineated in this document, and US&R is defined as, “Operational activities that 
include locating, extricating, and providing on-site medical treatment to victims trapped 
in collapsed structures.”15  Continuing the trend, FEMA is designated as the primary 
agency responsible for US&R activities, but DoD is once again listed as a support 
agency. Required adoption of NIMS was a key strategic move in that FEMA and other 
federal partners now had a framework for unified command and coordination of disparate 
forces working together in the same disaster environment—although the Katrina event 
demonstrated that this is not a fail-safe system, and must be embraced and exercised to be 
effective.  
The NRP authors also attempted to employ language that would distinguish 
between incidents that require DHS coordination—termed Incidents of National 
Significance—and the majority of incidents occurring each year, such as rain and snow 
storms that are handled by responsible state and local jurisdictions or agencies through 
their established authorities and plans.16  However, the NRP was not entirely clear 
regarding what triggered an incident of national significance. An example of this could be 
found where the NRP’s Planning Assumptions and Considerations provide that, “While 
all presidentially declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act are 
                                                 
13 George Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents 
(February 28, 2003), 2. 
14 Tom Ridge, Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (December 2004), i. 
15 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (December 2004), 73. 
16 U.S. General Accounting Office, Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T, 11. 
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considered Incidents of National Significance, not all Incidents of National Significance 
necessarily result in disaster or emergency declarations under the Stafford Act.”17  
Whether a disaster declaration is made or not would be a factor in the availability of 
FEMA US&R task forces or DoD assets in a disaster. 
The NRP was superseded by a new document—the National Response 
Framework—on March 22, 2008. According to the National Response Framework 
(NRF), successful disaster response operations require unity of effort through unified 
command with a structure that, “respects the chain of command of each participating 
organization while harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of 
common objectives.”  The NRF outlines objectives for various federal agencies and the 
responsibilities of other key agencies. However, this is a strategic document that provides 
guidelines for the nation at large, without going into specific detail about planning efforts 
between civilian and military organizations for response operations.18  The mission and 
purpose of FEMA US&R task forces evolves with the creation of this document when it 
states that they “can be deployed by FEMA to assist state, tribal, and local governments 
in rescuing victims of structural collapse incidents or to assist in other search and rescue 
missions.”19  This document also specifically mentions the National Guard as a crucial 
state resource with expertise in several areas—including search and rescue.20  In 
reviewing the Emergency Support Function annexes, this version of the national response 
document was the first time that ESF #9 was categorized as simply Search and Rescue 
instead of US&R.21 
Another relevant notation included in the NRF document clarified that, although 
federal disaster assistance is often thought of as synonymous with presidential 
declarations and the Stafford Act, this is not always the case. There are several situations 
where federal assistance does not require coordination by DHS and can be provided 
                                                 
17 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (December 2004), 7. 
18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (January 2008), 10. 
19 Ibid., 62. 
20 Ibid., 39. 
21 Ibid., 59. 
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without a presidential major disaster or emergency declaration—one of those situations 
being activities covered under the National Search and Rescue Plan.22  The National 
Search and Rescue Plan of the United States (NSP) identifies a number of entities beyond 
state and local resources that could be involved in civil search and rescue operations. The 
list includes partners from the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Defense, and the Department of Interior.23 The NSP also offers another variation on the 
specific definition of US&R as, “The location, rescue (extrication), and initial medical 
stabilization of victims trapped in confined spaces.”24 Although the NSP includes a basic 
framework for each of these agencies to participate in search and rescue operations—and 
this seemingly provides a means for guidance of SAR resources in natural or other 
disasters—there does not appear to have been appropriate training and exercising for the 
concept of unified command and unity of effort between the key agencies. The NSP lists 
several salient objectives such as providing a “United States Plan for coordinating civil 
SAR services to meet domestic needs,” and providing, “an overall Plan for coordination 
of civil SAR operations and effective use of available resources,” and integrating 
“available civil SAR resources into a cooperative network for greater protection of life 
and property and to ensure greater efficiency and economy.”25  The Hurricane Katrina 
event highlighted the lack of cooperation and coordination between the various federal 
agencies in the search and rescue arena; while these objectives were published in the NSP 
in 2007, this paper examines more recent events to determine whether measurable 
progress has been made improving coordination, efficiency, and economy. 
Although several entities exist at the local, state and federal level, which will be 
involved in search and rescue operations following a disaster or catastrophe, the training 
and exercising between these stakeholders is found to be lacking. Following catastrophic 
events in the past, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the need for improvements in the 
                                                 
22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (January 2008), 24. 
23 2007 National Search and Rescue Plan, National Search and Rescue Committee (2007), 4.  
24 Ibid., 2. 
25 Ibid., 3. 
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national search and rescue enterprise was acknowledged. 26 While much progress has 
been made in anticipating the need for better command and control and integration of 
forces, there still appears to be a gap in the architecture that would provide for a common 
national US&R strategy that effectively brings together available resources from FEMA, 
the National Guard, the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the Department of 
Interior. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can the FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams be used more 
effectively and efficiently in the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE)?  
1. Are there other strategies that would allow the FEMA US&R resources to 
be more adaptable in the HSE?  
2. What other disciplines could be integrated with the FEMA US&R task 
forces to improve their mission capabilities and the return on investment 
in disasters? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To conduct research for this thesis related to the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) strategies, this project uses a 
comparative case study format in order to explore use of US&R resources from the 
National Urban Search and Rescue Response System where they were deployed to the 
Hurricane Katrina Disaster in August of 2005, and the Hurricane Irene Disaster in August 
of 2011. Literature and data was reviewed and collected while operating under the 
hypothesis that there is no national strategy that effectively brings together available 
urban search and rescue resources from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). 
Rather than solely trying to subjectively identify where deficiencies might be in our 
                                                 
26 U.S. General Accounting Office, Hurricane Katrina, GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery;  Statement of  David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the 
United States. GAO-06-442T (March 8, 2008), 13. 
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US&R policies, this research sought  to identify strengths and weaknesses from 
deployments to past events—while seeking potential best practices that could be 
incorporated into the overall strategy of the broader Urban Search and Rescue enterprise. 
Data was collected for this thesis primarily through published documents. It 
involved research of primary sources produced by the agencies for the events that are 
used as case studies, as well as reviews of the programs from various sources. It also 
involved a literary review that examined theoretical issues underlying the primary 
research question and problem space. Research began with existing academic studies that 
are relevant to the underlying assumptions of this thesis, specifically related to the 
research question and the sub-questions. Although a portion of the metrics for this 
research are derived from my professional experience, the National US&R program has 
been operating for more than twenty years, and data exists with regard to the activities of 
the US&R teams, and interactions with other associated entities during their 
deployments.  
This research began by reviewing how the national preparedness system in the 
United States came about and how it has evolved. The initial portion of the review 
focused on the creation of FEMA in 1979, and their involvement with disaster response. 
Several guidance documents pertaining to national disaster response plans and strategies 
were reviewed, including: 
• Federal Response Plan (1999) 
• National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) 
• National Response Plan (2004) 
• National Response Framework (2008) 
Since this thesis is centered around the national strategy for urban search and 
rescue resources, several key documents providing an orientation to the overarching 
strategic and operational search and rescue efforts in the United States were identified 
and reviewed, including: 




• National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS) 
• National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP) 
• NRF Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9—Search and Rescue Annex  
Perhaps the most salient documents examined related to the current and projected 
strategic direction of National US&R Response System resources are: 
• National US&R Response System Strategic Training Plan 2011–2015 
(December 2010) 
 
• FEMA Incident Management and Support Keystone (January 2011)  
• Review of the National US&R Response System (March 2012) 
• National US&R Response System Strategic Plan 2012–2016 (Draft #8 – 
January 2012) 
Additionally, documents and Internet sources were examined related to the impetus and 
development of FEMA US&R Task Forces, the sponsoring agencies, and the National 
US&R Response System. The FEMA Incident Management and Support Keystone 
document lists a number of foundational documents that provide statutory, regulatory, 
and executive guidance for FEMA disaster response. In order to gain an understanding of 
the original US&R mission, how the teams have been used, and how their mission has 
changed, several after action reports were collected and reviewed along with multiple 
disaster relevant documents from the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 
the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS). This research also considers information extracted from a number of other 
sources, including video and transcripts of testimony related to US&R, several individual 
US&R task force web sites, and a number of articles from various journals and magazine 
publications.  
The responses to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Irene in 2011 were 
chosen for case studies because both events had robust FEMA US&R responses, and the 
analysis of said responses would help to answer the main question regarding how FEMA 
US&R teams can perhaps be used more effectively and efficiently in the Homeland 
Security enterprise. The Hurricane Katrina event resulted in the largest US&R 
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deployment in the history of the program, with all 28 national task forces accepting 
deployments. The teams conducted US&R operations following Katrina in what is 
considered non-traditional environments (water) alongside a number of other federal 
agencies—and the coordination between the agencies received much criticism. Following 
the Katrina event, key policy changes were made in the development of the National 
Response Framework (NRF), and in the form of the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act, which greatly enhanced FEMA’s role in disaster response.27  
The DoD and National Guard also made key policy changes after the Katrina event, 
where the Dual Status Commander concept was implemented with the intention of Unity 
of Effort through Unity of Command and improved coordination and collaboration with 
other response entities, such as FEMA and the US&R task forces.  
The response to Hurricane Irene in 2011 also had a robust US&R response; 
however, this event took place six years after Katrina and several years after the policy 
changes were enacted within the agencies mentioned above. A case study of the US&R 
response and the activities of cooperating agencies for Hurricane Irene were used in this 
research to determine whether strategies for using US&R assets have further evolved and 
improved. Analyzing and comparing the responses to these two hurricane events will 
help to answer the questions regarding how FEMA US&R teams can be used more 
effectively and efficiently in the disaster environment—and whether other disciplines 
could be integrated with the FEMA US&R resources to improve their mission 
capabilities and our return on investment for the teams during disasters. 
 
                                                 
27 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, Public Law 109-295 (October 4, 2006). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is in fact nothing short of a miracle that the modern methods of 
instruction have not yet entirely strangled the holy curiosity of inquiry; for 
this delicate little plant, aside from stimulation, stands mainly in need of 
freedom; without this it goes to wrack and ruin without fail. It is a very 
grave mistake to think that the enjoyment of seeing and searching can be 




The literature review in this chapter examined various sources seeking to discover 
information available related to the concept of whether a better strategy exists for 
utilizing the search and rescue (SAR) resources within the United States for urban search 
and rescue (US&R) assignments during a catastrophic disaster or other domestic 
calamity. The review sought to determine: 
1. What are the guiding principles for SAR programs in the United States? 
 
2. What primary agencies or entities are responsible for catastrophic SAR? 
 
3. What literature is available to describe the evolution of SAR policies and 
doctrine? 
 
4. Has any literature been developed related to collaboration and 
coordination between the resources or utilizing them beyond a 
“traditional” US&R role? 
 
5. Can US&R assets be used more effectively in the homeland security 
enterprise? 
The review conducted examines literature surrounding some of the underlying 
concepts described in the research questions and problem space. The review is intended 
to explore three general areas: What is known, what is not known, and what we need to 
know. The review explores what literature available related to search and rescue policy 
and guidance at the federal, state and local levels. Literature was examined related to the 
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FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Force program and the existing response 
mission, and seeks to identify literature describing what other programs are capable of 
doing in the US&R responses catastrophic events—specifically federal and state military 
resources, and seeks to identify gaps in the national US&R mission policies.  
A 2008 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) examining national 
emergency preparedness efforts discusses specific search and rescue (SAR) tactical 
mission assignments, but makes no mention of coordination between search and rescue 
components from other pertinent federal agencies.28  Search and rescue literature from 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reveals an abundant amount of 
information related the current Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) task force model on 
the existing 28 national US&R teams.29   
The literature from FEMA states that US&R is considered a “multi-hazard” 
discipline, as the task forces can hypothetically be utilized for response to a variety of 
emergencies or disasters, “including earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms and 
tornadoes, floods, dam failures, technological accidents, terrorist activities, and hazardous 
materials releases.”30  One problem with this depiction of a multi-hazard discipline is that 
the description does not represent the apparent lack of “discipline diversity” in the US&R 
team structure—where the majority of team members are firefighters. The literature 
indicates the original design of US&R task forces utilized firefighters because of their 
training for search and rescue (SAR) operations—but this design may ignore the potential 
benefits of adding more personnel from disciplines such as law enforcement, public 
works, and emergency management.  
Creating an interdisciplinary framework could potentially expand the US&R task 
force mission capabilities—providing more flexibility, efficiency and value. The need to 
expand the skill set in the US&R arena has been conveyed at the highest levels of 
                                                 
28 U.S. General Accounting Office, Emergency Management, Observations on DHS’s Preparedness 
for Catastrophic Disasters, Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr. Director Homeland Security and Justice, 
GAO Report GAO-08-868T (Washington: June 11, 2008), 13. 
29 The terms “task force” and “team” are oftentimes used interchangeably when referring to the 
FEMA US&R resources, and that practice applies to this document as well. 
30 “US&R,” Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
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leadership—and in testimony before the United States House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response Committee 
on Homeland Security, FEMA US&R Branch Chief Fred Endrikat stated that the 
numerous and complex responses have, “increased the urgency for us to continue to 
improve our skills.”31  
The concept of search and rescue in the United States was explored extensively in 
a Naval Postgraduate School research paper in 2009. The paper explored what was 
referred to as the, “search and rescue megacommunity” including the concept of 
coordinated air and ground efforts and the possibility of creating, “a framework for 
developing a SAR coordination center using experiences of the wildland firefighting 
community and the United States Secret Service.”32  Since this paper, significant 
enhancements have been made in the command and control options for federal and state 
military personnel during disasters, and further research is needed to determine what 
progress has been made, and what we still may not know. 
B. SCOPE 
The scope of the literature review was focused around search and rescue for 
catastrophic events. The National Response Framework indicates, “A catastrophic 
incident is any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, which results in 
extraordinary levels of mass causalities, damage, or disruption severely affecting the 
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government 
functions.”33  Hurricane Katrina in 2005 provides a good example of government 
response to a large-scale catastrophic incident, after which many policies were developed 
or modified in an effort to improve search and rescue response operations. Criticism for 
the response to Katrina was widespread and reports indicate that SAR was not well 
coordinated and did not have a unified command structure. The literature further 
                                                 
31 Fred Endrikat, “Assessing the Capabilities and Coordination of Federal Emergency Response 
Teams,” Testimony before the United States House of Representatives. Washington, DC: U.S. House of 
Representatives (2007). 
32 Eric M. Bleakney, “Finding the “Sweet Spot” for Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (September 2011). 
33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, January 2008, 42. 
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indicated that no single organization had a common operating picture for catastrophic 
SAR during Hurricane Katrina because of the event complexity, and a lack of prior 
response planning and exercising.34  Literature produced after Hurricane Irene in 2011 
provides a more recent perspective on catastrophic search and rescue planning and 
response. The military developed a landmark plan in 2011, which is intended to provide 
better command and coordination between state and federal military resources in support 
of civil authorities; Hurricane Irene presented the first opportunity to exercise the plan 
during an event. 35 
Several documents related to search and rescue in the United States were found to 
be relevant and were examined in this review. A review of guidance documents revealed 
that the concept of mass search and rescue focuses resources on delivering immediate 
response to large numbers of distressed people. Under the NRF, federal search and rescue 
activities occur, “across three operational environments: structural collapse or urban 
search and rescue (US&R), led by FEMA; maritime/coastal/waterborne search and 
rescue, led by the USCG; and land search and rescue, led by the National Park Service 
(NPS) within the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) and DoD.”36  The focus of this 
research is how resources are utilized for urban search and rescue assignments during a 
disaster; therefore, documents associated to the category of maritime, coastal and 
waterborne search and rescue were reviewed only if there was a correlated component.  
This review identified four primary documents providing an orientation to the 
strategic and operational search and rescue efforts in the United States: 
1. The International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue 
(IAMSAR) Manual. 
                                                 
34 U.S. General Accounting Office, Hurricane Katrina, Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO Report GAO-06-643 (Washington: May 
2006), 7–11. 
35 Army National Guard, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, DoD Announces Hurricane 
Irene Dual-Status Commanders (August 27, 2011)  
36 Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National 
Preparedness Report (March 30, 2012), 38. 
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2. The U.S. National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS) to the IAMSAR 
Manual. 
3. The National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP). 
4. The National Response Framework (NRF).  
The elements of this review are founded primarily in the components of these four 
documents relating to US&R and other land-based search and rescue operations.  
The research indicates that the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search 
and Rescue (IAMSAR) manual is considered the basic document for SAR for United 
States Federal Agencies as described in the National Search and Rescue Plan. The 
manual is produced in three volumes, each specifically targeted to different levels of the 
SAR system.37  The National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP) is signed by the 
Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Interior, Commerce, Transportation, the 
Federal Communications Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. This plan is relevant to the research as it establishes overarching federal 
SAR policy in the United States.38  The NSP adopts the IAMSAR Manual and the NSS to 
the IAMSAR Manual for use by search and rescue agencies in the United States. The 
NSP also supports federal efforts in response to catastrophic incidents as described in the 
National Response Framework and Emergency Support Function #9, Search and Rescue. 
The NSP is a central document in the national search and rescue community that states 
that it is the “policy of the signatory federal agencies to provide a National Search and 
Rescue Plan for the United States for coordinating search and rescue (SAR) services to 
meet domestic needs and international commitments.”   
A partner document to the NSP is the United States National Search and Rescue 
Committee Interagency Agreement. This agreement indicates the committee will serve 
as, “the primary coordinating forum within the federal government for the conduct and 
support of civil SAR operations covered by the NSP, and for matters relating to national 
                                                 
37 Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard.  
38 J. T. Riker (November 10, 2009), National Search and Rescue Committee, Letter of Promulgation, 
Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Supplement.  
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civil SAR policies and positions.”39  Review of this literature indicates that the NSP is in 
addition to the National Response Plan (NRP), which covers federal responses to 
declared Incidents of National Significance. The NSP covers all civil SAR operations, 
whether conducted independently or concurrently with the NRP. However, this plan 
would be a subordinate document, and becomes a supporting plan by integrating on 
matters relating to coordination and conduct of disaster response search and rescue 
operations.40  One area of the NSP document reveals a key component where the 
National Search and Rescue Plan does not cover, “Operations and coordination that 
might be carried out concurrently with civil SAR operations on scene, such as could 
occur during a disaster or terrorism response situation, or an Incident of National 
Significance.” This area will require additional research and analysis to determine the 
relevance of this statement.41  Although the NSP document confirms that senior 
leadership in a number of federal organizations was cognizant of the need for 
coordination between search and rescue assets within the various organizations, there is 
no mention of a mechanism for creating a collaborative framework.  
C. FEMA NATIONAL URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE (US&R) PROGRAM  
In exploring the role of the FEMA US&R Program in the broader national search 
and rescue enterprise, there were a number of sources of literature ranging from policy 
manuals, committee reports, transcripts of testimony, and books among others. Search 
and rescue resources from FEMA are normally deployed as US&R Task Forces under the 
authority of Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9 as part of the National Response 
Framework.42   
Information related to the composition of each team indicates a roster of up to 70 
members, along with an equipment cache required for a standard FEMA US&R task 
                                                 
39 National Search and Rescue Committee, “National Search and Rescue Committee Interagency 
Agreement.” 
40 Ibid. 
41 National Search and Rescue Committee, “National Search and Rescue Plan for the United States.” 
42 National Response Framework, Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9 – Search and Rescue.  
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force, which is extremely heavy and potentially cumbersome.43  This would be among the 
reasons perhaps limiting an expedient response to disasters—oftentimes resulting in a 
response delay of several days. The current US&R paradigm involves locating victims in 
a disaster situation (usually in a confined space), rescue (extrication), and initial medical 
stabilization of those who are injured. According to FEMA, “Structural collapse is most 
often the cause of victims being trapped, but victims may also be trapped in 
transportation accidents, mines and collapsed trenches.”44 Literature available indicates 
that FEMA US&R task forces have responded to several catastrophic events since their 
inception in 1989. The list includes events such as the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. 
Murrah building in Oklahoma City, the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the Kansas grain 
elevator explosion in 1998 and earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999, along with the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.45  However, only two of the FEMA US&R task forces are 
approved for responses outside the United States, and these teams were dispatched 
internationally in 2010 and 2011 to Haiti, New Zealand, and Japan for the earthquake and 
tsunami disasters in those countries.46 47   
Several sources of literature indicate that there is a definite hierarchal structure to 
the US&R task forces; the entire team travels together, and there is little flexibility. A 
smaller version of the task force can be deployed with a smaller number of members and 
was intended to be utilized for fast response and rapid reconnaissance.48  The literature 
reveals that many of the national US&R task forces maintain impressive lists of past  
 
 
                                                 
43 “US&R Equipment,” Federal Emergency Management Agency.  
44 Ibid. 
45 “About US&R,” Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
46 Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National 
Preparedness Report (March 30, 2012), 38. 
47 “Tsunami Update 4: Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) deploying to Japan” (March 11, 2012) 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (blog). 
48 “FEMA Urban Search and Rescue,” Nevada Task Force One.  
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national and international deployments.49 50 51  However, the lists of deployments do not 
reflect mission value or accomplishments—and while the local agencies normally 
complete an after-action report, there is not a national database or review process to 
measure the appropriateness of the missions or the overall effectiveness of US&R task 
forces in these deployments.  
The overwhelming majority of FEMA US&R are sponsored and staffed by fire 
department personnel. In exploring what benefits could be incorporated into the 
framework of the teams, a review of research conducted by Joseph Duggan from the New 
York Fire Department reveals that he concluded, “The FDNY and NYPD can achieve an 
emergency services synergy adapting NY-TF1 organizational designs and systemic 
processes into the greater response relationship.”52  A report by United States Agency 
International Development (USAID) related to the US&R teams operating in Haiti 
following the 2010 earthquake noted that security concerns were among the primary 
challenges facing the US&R teams in the operational environment.53  Developing a 
coordinated search and rescue strategy between military and FEMA US&R teams could 
be a way of reconciling some of the security concerns, and this warrants additional 
exploration. 
In seeking to determine the efficiency of the current FEMA US&R response 
model, documents from a hearing report related to the US&R response to Hurricane 
Katrina were also reviewed. In the hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, Senator Susan Collins of Maine stated, “The individual 
heroism and the extraordinary efforts that occurred cannot mask the fact that coordination 
at all levels of government was poor, resulting in the inefficient use of resources, needless 
                                                 
49 Ray Downey, Task Force Operations: An Overview. Fire Engineering (November, 1995). 
50 “Urban Search and Rescue,” Miami-Dade County Fire Rescue Department. 
51 “Past Missions,” Virginia Task Force 1 International Search and Rescue. 
52 Joseph Duggan, The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team (NY-TF1) a Case Study of 
Interagency Effectiveness. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 
53 United States Agency International Development (USAID), Fact Sheet #4, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 
(January 16, 2010). 
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danger to first responders, and prolonged suffering for the victims.”54  This report 
contains plenteous information and testimony related to the US&R training leading up to, 
and the response to Hurricane Katrina. One factor being considered at the federal level as 
stated in a recent GAO report is whether the FEMA US&R teams duplicate the 
capabilities and authorities of other federal response teams.55   
Unfortunately, the original vision of needing a dedicated national framework for 
an urban search and rescue response element has seemingly never materialized, and there 
is little documented evidence that would provide domestic examples of actual rescues 
(using heavy search and rescue) from a structural collapse by FEMA US&R personnel 
since the inception of the program. Many of the challenges posed by large-scale 
catastrophic events—such as the World Trade Center (WTC) terrorist attack, Hurricane 
Katrina, and the Japan earthquake—require higher-level thinking skills that are not 
necessarily considered or evaluated in the current selection process for members of the 
FEMA US&R task forces. Local resources are quickly overwhelmed by the size and 
complexity of these types of events, and having a well-trained team of personnel with a 
creative skill set would be highly sought after.  
Although not reflected as one of the standard mission responsibilities for a US&R 
task force, the web page for Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department indicates they 
have a long-term partnership with USAID in the provision of specialized humanitarian 
relief, including deployments of this type as well as urban search and rescue.56  This 
section of the literature review found that information and resources related to the current 
configuration and policies of the FEMA US&R program is readily available. The FEMA 
US&R teams were used in many disaster situations both domestically and internationally, 
although there was little literature available in the past to indicate the appropriateness or 
effectiveness of the teams or their policies during the deployments. However, this 
                                                 
54 Senator Susan M. Collins, Senate Hearing 109-757, “Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue 
in a Catastrophe” (January 30, 2006). 
55 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied 
Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination, GAO Report GAO-01-14 (Washington: 
November 30, 2000).  
56 Virginia Task Force 1 (VA-TF1) website, International Search and Rescue.  
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research found a comprehensive report released in March 2012, reflecting a bottom-up 
review of the national urban search and rescue response system. This report offers 
information related to US&R deployments over the past two decades that would help to 
determine what changes could be made in our FEMA US&R policies and strategies that 
would allow the FEMA US&R teams to be more adaptable and effective in the homeland 
security enterprise. 
D. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN DOMESTIC DISASTERS 
Literature related to the Army National Guard was also reviewed. Because both 
state Army National Guard and the Army National Guard of the United States relatively 
go hand-in-hand, they are both usually referred to as just Army National Guard. The 
Army National Guard (ARNG) is one component of the Army (which consists of the 
Active Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.) The literature shows that 
the Army National Guard is composed primarily of traditional Guardsmen—civilians 
who serve their country, state and community on a part-time basis (usually one weekend 
each month and two weeks during the summer.) Each state, most territories and the 
District of Columbia have their own National Guard, as provided for by the Constitution 
of the United States. The National Guard (NG) is unlike any other service in that the NG 
serves a dual-role purpose. The primary role and commitment is to the state in times of 
natural disasters, civic disturbances and more. The second role is to federal missions of 
overseas deployments, and providing coverage for active duty personal on military 
installations during active duty deployments in times of conflict.57  Because of the 
National Guard’s stated role in serving the state in times of disaster, literature was 
reviewed to consider what role the NG could play in the search and rescue arena. 
Specifically, this information is used in addressing the research question of what other 
disciplines could be integrated with the US&R resources to improve their mission 
capabilities and the return on investment in disasters. 
Following the Hurricane Katrina event in 2005, one comprehensive report found 
that the Department of Defense (DoD) emergency response plan for providing military 
                                                 
57 Army National Guard, About Us (2012). 
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assistance to civil authorities during disasters lacked adequate detail. The plan did not 
account for the full range of assistance that might be provided by DoD, did not clearly 
divide tasks between the National Guard and the federal responders, or establish response 
time frames. National Guard state plans were also found to be inadequate, did not 
consider the level of outside assistance that would be needed during a catastrophe, and 
they were not synchronized with federal plans. Lastly, the report found that DoD’s 
exercise plans had not been appropriately tested with a robust exercise program.58   
E. UNITED STATES ARMY IN DOMESTIC DISASTERS 
Literature related to the United States Army in disaster response was also 
reviewed. The United States Army is a branch of the Department of Defense, and this 
review found that DoD responds to domestic disasters and/or emergencies in accordance 
with a variety of plans with different federal agencies in the lead. The most prominent of 
these plans is the National Response Framework (NRF), which is coordinated by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The DoD was historically constrained 
as to the services it can perform in support of civil authorities by the provisions of the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act.59  However, this review found that significant 
steps have been taken since the terrorist events of September 2001 to improve civil 
support in the form of the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) program, and the 
role of the U.S. Army in disasters has been expanded.60  The DSCA concept, which is led 
by USNORTHCOM, is the contemporary aspect of the Title 10 response mission in the 
homeland.61 
Further research found that the NRF indicates, “Department of Defense (DoD) is 
a full partner in the federal response to domestic incidents, and its response is fully 
                                                 
58 U.S. General Accounting Office, Hurricane Katrina, Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO Report GAO-06-643 (Washington: May 
2006), 2.  
59 Global Security.Org, Homeland Security, Domestic Support Operations. 
60 William J. Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Department of Defense Directive Number 
3025.18,” (December 29, 2010), 1–6. 
61 United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). 
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coordinated through the mechanisms of the framework.”62  Although the U.S. Army 
(Army) may not have resources specifically dedicated to performing SAR operations in a 
disaster, a review of the NRF indicates the authors and contributors considered this type 
of assistance when they wrote, “Federal departments and agencies must remain flexible 
and adaptable in order to provide the support that is required for a particular incident.”63  
The NRF further reveals that federal military resources used in a domestic disaster would 
be represented by a Department of Defense representative in the Unified Coordination 
Group.64   
Yet another report found that DoD was taking the lessons learned from Hurricane 
Katrina and was aware of disaster response problems described in this same report, and 
was developing solutions to address and to prepare for the next catastrophic event. This 
report also found that many of the issues identified during the aftermath of Katrina are 
very challenging because they are often complex, cross agency boundaries, and are, in 
some cases, long standing.65  Because this report was produced in 2006, further 
investigation is need to determine the relevance and to evaluate progress made by DoD in 
improving collaboration and coordination with other agencies during a catastrophic 
event. 
Literature to clarify the role of the Army in disaster search and rescue is limited. 
Research indicates there may only be one Army unit near the U.S. Capitol Region 
specifically trained and equipped for disaster US&R operations—the 911th Engineer 
Company.66  Although the research did not reveal specific literature to indicate a large 
amount of Army resources allocated to SAR in disasters, DoD participation is mentioned 
in several documents including, the National Search Plan (NSP), the National Response 
Framework (NRF), and ESF #9.  
                                                 
62 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, January 2008, 11. 
63 Ibid., 42. 
64 Ibid., 64. 
65 U.S. General Accounting Office, Hurricane Katrina, Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO Report GAO-06-643, (Washington: May, 
2006), 35. 
66 Justin Creech, Belvoir Eagle, Rappelling training increases urban rescue Soldiers’ skills, 
confidence (September 2010).  
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Another salient concept that was explored during this portion of the review was 
the military Dual Status Command (DSC) construct. The literature indicates that DSC 
was criticized as a major factor and significant causal factor for hindering the military 
response to Hurricane Katrina—where DoD military personnel and State National Guard 
personnel were deployed through separate and uncoordinated chains of command. State 
military forces were employed under the control of the governor, and federal military 
forces were employed under the control of the president. The literature reflects that the 
DSC construct has evolved and this concept is relevant and significant because federal 
military assets have traditionally not been a common resource seen in domestic disaster 
situations—and with DSC we may see a unity of effort between state and federal military 
resources basically being commanded by one officer from the NG.67  Further exploration 
in this area will help to answer the question of how these resources might be coordinated 
and integrated with the FEMA US&R task forces to improve their mission capabilities 
and the return on investment in disasters. 
F. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD IN DOMESTIC DISASTERS 
A key component of the literature review was the exploration of the United States 
Coast Guard in their search and rescue mission. Research revealed that the U.S. Coast 
Guard (CG) is one of the five armed forces of the United States, and the only military 
organization within the Department of Homeland Security. The CG maintains a presence 
in our ports, rivers, oceans and other waterways—and the CG impact can be local, 
regional, national and international. The literature indicates search and rescue (SAR) is 
one of the Coast Guard’s oldest missions.68  The CG operates a large fleet of aircraft and 
boats that are used in SAR operations; although most often limited to waterborne rescues, 
the CG has played a prominent role in domestic disaster SAR operations. One of the 
largest search and rescue operations in the history of the United States took place in 2005 
as a result of Hurricane Katrina. The research reveals that the CG initiated a massive 
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Response to Domestic Disasters,” Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Volume 7, Article 4 (February 
2011). 
68 United States Coast Guard, United States Department of Homeland Security. 
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SAR resource deployment, and was one of the very few entities receiving praise and 
accolades for their response. This event will provide a historical perspective on Coast 
Guard coordination with other agencies in the SAR response during a major disaster.69  
The literature reflects a prominent role for the Coast Guard in the national SAR 
community, and a history of successful operations when other agencies have struggled. 
However, further research and review in this area is needed to determine how command 
and control of CG assets would be handled during a disaster today, and will help to 
answer the question of how CG search and rescue resources could be integrated with the 
FEMA US&R task forces to improve their mission capabilities and the return on 
investment in disasters. 
G. UNITY OF EFFORT 
In seeking to determine how collaboration and coordination between federal, 
state, and local search and rescue resources could be improved, this review also examined 
literature surrounding unity of effort.70  The literature confirms that the Unity of Effort 
concept is integral to the idea of collaboration and coordination. In 2010, the DoD 
entered into a new partnership with state resources in what is being referred to as the 
“Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort.”71  In answering the question of how 
collaboration and coordination between SAR resources be improved, the Unity of Effort 
is one of the more prominent issues. In a presentation by Michael Byrne from FEMA, he 
indicated that “collaboration and coordination” would likely replace any preconceived 
notions of “command and control” in the complex interactions taking place between 
responders in a disaster environment.72   
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In a 2010 paper on the National Guard and military reserve forces, authors John 
Nagl and Travis Sharp discussed the unity of effort concept and stated,  
On the contentious issue of command and control, DoD leaders should 
continue, in coordination with the Council of Governors, to develop 
protocols allowing governors to direct federal forces engaged in disaster 
response in their states. DoD leaders should avoid getting dragged into 
unproductive jurisdictional debates and bureaucratic turf battles. Frequent 
training and exercises can provide confidence that planning for “unity of 
effort” is in fact progressing as intended.73  
This was an interesting observation in that DoD made progress in reconciling the barriers 
to effective cooperation when the Dual Status Command construct was enhanced in 
2011.74 
H. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
A wealth of information and literature was discovered referencing policy, 
doctrine, and authority of various local, state, and federal resources in regard to response 
and assistance (including search and rescue) during a domestic disaster or catastrophe. 
The literature demonstrates that resources for response to large events that exceed local 
capabilities are available primarily through State National Guards, and two federal 
departments–the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of 
Defense (DoD). Although various documents make a distinction between an emergency, 
a disaster and a catastrophe, the level of response for the purposes of urban search and 
rescue would likely not be altered by this distinction.75 The National Response 
Framework (NRF) makes little distinction between the military response to smaller, 
regional disasters and the military response to large-scale, catastrophic natural disasters. 
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This is a seemingly significant oversight in that past disasters have shown that the 
military tends to play a much larger role in catastrophes.76   
The GAO produced a report following Hurricane Katrina that found agency 
disaster plans had not been tested and refined with a robust exercise program. Further, the 
report stated, “the Homeland Security Council has issued fifteen national planning 
scenarios—including a major hurricane scenario—that provide the basis for disaster 
exercises throughout the nation.”77 The various agencies explored in the literature review 
indicate an expected role in domestic disaster response, and several agencies reflect a 
training and exercise program. However, there is a gap in the literature reflecting a 
national exercise program for search and rescue operations—in particular, a program that 
would exercise the coordination and collaboration between the various local, state and 
federal entities that will be operating together in a disaster environment. 
Further research is needed to determine how state agencies and federal resources 
from the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the 
Department of Interior will coordinate and collaborate in their search and rescue 
responsibilities during a disaster. Subsequent chapters explore the interaction between 
FEMA US&R Response System resources and the various other response agencies in an 
attempt to clarify their roles in the national search and rescue construct of the homeland 
security enterprise. 
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III. BACKGROUND  
This chapter provides a detailed perspective of the overarching federal search and 
rescue policy and guidance documents, along with a comprehensive review of the 
creation and evolution of the FEMA National Urban Search and Rescue Response 
System. Additionally, an overview of several federal search and rescue partner agencies 
is included in the chapter. 
For the reader, a basic definition of Search and Rescue is offered in two parts—a 
search is an operation using available personnel and facilities to locate persons in some 
form of distress—and rescue is an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for 
their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety.78  As previously 
identified through the literature review, there are four (4) primary documents providing 
an orientation to the overarching strategic and operational search and rescue efforts in the 
United States. 
1. The International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue 
(IAMSAR) Manual  
 
2. The National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS) 
 
3. The National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP) 
 
4. The National Response Framework (NRF) 
The three-volume IAMSAR Manual is published jointly by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
and provides guidelines for a common aviation and maritime approach to organizing and 
providing search and rescue (SAR) services. The manual is organized so that each 
individual volume can be used as a standalone document or, in conjunction with the other 
two volumes, as a means to attain a full view of the SAR system.79  The research found 
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that the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) manual 
is considered the basic document for search and rescue (SAR) for United States Federal 
Agencies as described in the National Search and Rescue Plan, although the actual 
manual contains very little information related to urban search and rescue. The manual 
covers aspects common to aeronautical, maritime, and land SAR, and each of the three 
volumes is specifically targeted to different levels of the SAR system—such as 
organization, management, coordination, and training.80 
The United States National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (NSS) is a comprehensive 
document published in 2000 by the United States National Search and Rescue Committee 
(NSARC). The NSS is a domestic interagency supplement to the IAMSAR Manual—and 
while this supplement also covers aspects common to aeronautical, maritime, and land 
SAR, only those areas associated with land SAR or US&R were evaluated in this 
research. The NSS delineates between traditional search and rescue (SAR) and US&R, 
and clearly recognizes the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System is 
coordinated by FEMA,81  and also delineates that DoD resources from each branch of the 
military are available to assist in SAR operations.82  The NSS states that land SAR 
operations include such environments as, “wilderness areas, swiftwater, caves and 
mountains, and aeronautical operations.”83  The NSS has a section related to urban search 
and rescue, indicating that it is discussed specifically to avoid confusion as to how it fits 
in with the U.S. Civil SAR system. The NSS offers, “US&R operational activities include 
locating, extricating, and providing on-site medical treatment to victims trapped in 
collapsed structures.”84  A significant section of misinformation is reflected in the NSS 
where it states, “US&R is activated as part of the Federal Response Plan (FRP). As stated 
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in the NSP, civil SAR does not include operations such as typical disaster response 
operations, such as: locating and rescuing victims trapped in collapsed structures; or other 
assistance provided under the scope of the Federal Response Plan.”85  This information 
was taken from the 1999 version of the NSP, which is in conflict with—and was 
superseded by—the 2007 version.86  
The NSARC also developed an addendum to the NSS entitled, the Catastrophic 
Incident SAR (CISAR) Addendum, with the latest version (3.0) having been published in 
2012. The addendum indicates that CISAR consists of civil SAR operations carried out 
during the response to an emergency or disaster declared by the president under 
provisions of the NRF and ESF #9.87   The National Response Framework states, “A 
catastrophic incident is defined as any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, 
that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely 
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or 
government functions.” One of the policies listed in ESF #9 is that, “SAR operations are 
conducted following the NRF and NSP, and the U.S. National SAR Supplement (NSS), 
Catastrophic Incident SAR (CISAR) Addendum, and other addenda that define SAR 
responsibilities and provide guidance to the federal departments and agencies with civil 
SAR mandates.”88  The concept of CISAR has seemingly been accepted as a component 
of the strategic and operational guidance documents related to search and rescue. 
However, the main function of the CISAR addendum is apparently to delineate between 
search and rescue operations conducted after a disaster declaration—which is termed 
Catastrophic Incident SAR—and normal domestic SAR operations. The CISAR term is 
not yet ubiquitous in the search and rescue environment—and although very informative, 
large sections of the addendum are somewhat redundant in that the pages are duplications 
of material from other publications such as the NRF.  
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The National Search and Rescue Plan for the United States (NSP) was developed 
by the National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC). The NSARC is responsible for 
the provisions of the NSP, consistent with applicable laws and executive orders, and 
coordinates and provides guidance for its implementation. The NSP indicates that it is 
intended, “solely intended to provide guidance to the participants.”89  The most notable 
change between the 1999 version of the NSP and the 2007 version was the addition of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the list of participants—which brought the 
United States Coast Guard (USCG) and FEMA into the stakeholder process. Other 
participants include the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Defense 
(DoD), the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department 
of the Interior (DOI) National Park Service (NPS).90 
The National Response Framework (NRF) superseded the National Response 
Plan (NRP), and describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents 
that range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic 
natural disasters.91  The NRF covers federal responses to declared disasters; while the 
NSP covers all civil SAR operations, whether conducted independently or concurrently 
with the NRF. Although this is a federal guidance document, the NSP does not create a 
conflict because it clearly states that if operations are carried out concurrently, the NSP 
simply becomes an NRF supporting plan by becoming an integrated source document on 
matters relating to coordination and conduct of disaster response SAR operations. When 
the NRF is implemented, civil SAR operations may very well continue to be covered by 
the NSP; the only difference is that civil SAR services would be coordinated with other 
NRF operations in the arena as directed by the Operations Section of the Incident 
Command Post or Unified Command established under NIMS.92   
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A partner document to the NSP is the United States National Search and Rescue 
Committee Interagency Agreement. This agreement indicates the committee will serve as 
“the primary coordinating forum within the federal government for the conduct and 
support of civil SAR operations covered by the NSP, and for matters relating to national 
civil SAR policies and positions.”93  This agreement also indicates that the NSP is in 
addition to the “National Response Plan,” but creates some level of confusion to the 
reader as the NSP consistently refers to the NRP. The NRP was superseded by the 
National Response Framework (NRF) in 2008, only a year after the NSP was published. 
The term, “Incidents of National Significance” is an example of a concept used in the 
NSP that was eliminated with the creation of the NRF.94  Ultimately, the NSP relates to 
all civil SAR operations, whether conducted independently or concurrently with the NRF. 
However, the NSP is a subordinate document and simply becomes a supporting 
document in the conduct of disaster response search and rescue operations.95   
Perhaps the most contemporary document available providing an orientation to 
the strategic and operational search and rescue efforts during a disaster in the United 
States is the National Response Framework—specifically the annex Emergency Support 
Function (ESF) #9.96  As the concepts of the NRP were carried forward, the NRF adopted 
the term “framework” within the title in an effort to make the document more accurately 
aligned with its intended purpose.  The NRF is comprised of a core document, a list of 
Emergency Support Function, Support, and Incident Annexes, and a set of Partner 
Guides. The NRF emphasizes that effective response to an incident is a shared 
responsibility of governments at all levels. In looking at how the NRF shapes SAR 
activities, the  Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes were developed to cluster 
federal resources and capabilities into functional areas that are most frequently needed in  
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a national response.97  The primary operational-level mechanism for providing assistance 
in functional areas such as search and rescue is the Emergency Support Functions—and 
ESF #9 is the Search and Rescue Annex.98 
Each ESF has a designated coordinator. The ESF #9 (Search and Rescue) 
Coordinator is FEMA (Under DHS). The functions listed under ESF #9 have been 
modified from past versions and are now simply, life-saving assistance and SAR 
operations. The definition of this annex changed when the NRF was published in 2008; 
the ESF #9 title was changed from Urban Search and Rescue to simply Search and 
Rescue (dropped the word Urban) and the main functional categories are now:  
1. Structural Collapse (Urban) Search and Rescue (US&R) 
2. Maritime/Coastal/Waterborne Search and Rescue 
3. Land Search and Rescue  
FEMA is the recognized ESF #9 Coordinator and will normally activate ESF #9 
when an incident is anticipated or occurs that may result in a request for an integrated 
SAR response to an impacted area. FEMA will designate the overall primary agency for 
an ESF #9 SAR response—and this designation is dependent upon incident 
circumstances and the type of response required. This could be elements such as FEMA 
US&R task forces, US Coast Guard assets, or Military resources—but FEMA is 
responsible for coordinating with other ESFs to ensure the most expedient and efficient 
resources are mobilized. The overall primary agency for an ESF is a Federal Agency with 
significant authorities, roles, resources, or capabilities for a particular function within a 
given ESF. 99  A Primary Agency serves as an executive agent under the Federal 
Coordinating Officer (or Federal Resource Coordinator for non-Stafford Act incidents) to 
accomplish the ESF mission. Other ESF #9 Agencies will provide support to the 
designated overall primary agency as required by the Unified Command.100   
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While FEMA is the designated primary agency for the first category listed as 
Structural Collapse Search and Rescue (US&R), the Department of Defense (DoD) is 
listed a support agency, although DoD was not previously considered a significant factor 
in strategic planning, and traditionally did not play a prominent role in the US&R 
environment during a disaster. This is a relevant factor when consideration is given that 
DoD has tremendous personnel resources and is one of the primary agencies in the third 
category of Land Search and Rescue—as the US&R and Land Search categories become 
comingled and the lines are blurred when you have mass search and rescue challenges in 
landscape style disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Tohoku Earthquake 
and Tsunami (Japan) in 2011. A “dual use” force consisting of elements from both 
agencies—along with others—could be more efficient and cost effective, and the concept 
of improved cooperation and coordination between FEMA and DoD is explored further 
in later chapters. 
A. FEMA NATIONAL US&R RESPONSE SYSTEM  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—as part of the 
Department of Homeland Security—is the primary agency identified in the NRF for 
Structural Collapse (Urban) Search and Rescue (US&R) situations. Accordingly, this 
section will cover the role of FEMA in US&R, the evolution of the national US&R 
response system and post-9/11 changes. The search and rescue annex of the NRF is 
Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9, and provides an operational overview that states, 
“US&R includes operations for natural and manmade disasters and catastrophic 
incidents, as well as other structural collapse operations that primarily require 
Department of Homeland Security FEMA US&R task force operations. FEMA is the 
designated ESF #9 Coordinator and will activate ESF #9 when an incident is anticipated 
or occurs that may result in a request for an integrated Search and Rescue response to an 
impacted area. The National US&R Response System integrates FEMA US&R task 
forces, Incident Support Teams (ISTs), and technical specialists.”101 
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FEMA refers to their Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) capability as the 
National US&R Response System. Since 1989, the National US&R Response System has 
built search and rescue capabilities at all response levels through a unique partnership 
between FEMA and state and local emergency management organizations, known as 
Sponsoring Agencies. FEMA provides funds to Sponsoring Agencies to organize, train, 
and equip National task forces from which the federal government can quickly deploy 
US&R resources in response to disasters or other events of national significance. FEMA 
currently manages agreements with 28 sponsoring agencies, the majority of which are 
staffed by Fire Department personnel.102  The operational teams that FEMA is 
responsible for administering, such as the US&R teams discussed here, are state and local 
first responders from around the country that volunteer to be activated, deployed, and 
reimbursed by FEMA for their help during response activities. FEMA manages and 
coordinates the overall program—and enforces standards, certifications, and 
qualifications for participation in such programs while also providing funding for 
equipment and training.103  The National US&R Response System derives statutory, 
regulatory and executive guidance from a number of foundational documents such as the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 as amended, PL 107-296, and the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, PL93-288, and the Code of 
Federal Regulations, 44 CFR 208. The elements of this system conduct all-hazard 
response operations through the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS).104 
One of the early events shaping the creation and development of the National 
US&R Response System in the United States was a catastrophic earthquake that occurred 
in the Prince William Sound region of Alaska in 1964 which resulted in 128 deaths and 
several hundred million dollars in damages.105 Following the 1964 Alaskan earthquake, 
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the United States Geological Service (USGS) provided recommendations in the federal 
government on how to better prepare for the earthquakes, and the United States Congress 
ultimately passed the Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act in 1977.106  This act provided 
Congress with an avenue to direct the U.S. President to “reduce the risk to life and 
property from earthquakes in United States,” predominantly through research and 
mitigation activities. Additionally, the act stated that steps should be taken to ensure, 
“adequate emergency medical resources, search and rescue personnel and equipment” are 
available after an earthquake.107 
In 1979, President Jimmy Carter created the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, and Congress directed FEMA to assume responsibility for the National 
Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) and required FEMA submit an 
interagency plan for the mitigation of, and response to earthquake hazards. This is 
considered significant because the U.S. Congress perhaps the first time authorized federal 
action and responsibility for disaster response efforts that were traditionally considered 
the responsibility of state and local governments.108  After FEMA assumed responsibility 
for the NEHRP, various states and the U.S. Agency for International Development 
realized there was a lack of sufficient heavy search and rescue capabilities across the 
United States. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was established 
in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy as the first U.S. foreign assistance organization 
whose primary emphasis was on long-range economic and social development assistance 
to foreign countries.109  Following the 1985 Mexico City earthquake several states began 
developing urban search and rescue teams—and in 1986, USAID entered into letters of 
agreement with the Fairfax County Fire Department in Virginia and the Metro Dade Fire 
and Rescue Department in Florida with a goal of further developing the concept of heavy 
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search and rescue resources that could be deployed internationally when needed.110  
Working with the U.S. State Department and Office of Foreign Disaster Aid, these teams 
provided vital search and rescue support for catastrophic earthquakes in Mexico City, the 
Philippines and Armenia.  This represented the first time that urban search and rescue 
teams were deployed earthquake operations outside the United States.111   
Considered one of the most significant program changes relevant to the history of 
the National US&R Response System, was the 1980 requirement that the director of 
FEMA submit an “interagency coordination plan for earthquake hazard mitigation and 
response” to Congress.112  Another significant turning point for the development of the 
national urban search and rescue response system in United States was the Loma Prieta 
earthquake in Northern California in October of 1989. This earthquake killed 63 people, 
injured approximately 4000, and caused nearly $10 billion in property damage—and the 
damage would likely have been much more catastrophic if the earthquake had occurred 
closer to the densely populated City of San Francisco.113  Following the Loma Prieta 
earthquake and similar disasters, FEMA announced the intent to develop a national urban 
search and rescue response system by partnering with state and local agencies that, when 
provided federal support could be deployed and utilized at the national level for structural 
collapse search and rescue missions. FEMA had no intention of building an in-house 
rescue capability, and the National US&R Response System was established as a federal, 
state, and local partnership.114  Also in this same time period, the United States Congress 
and FEMA revisited the scope of the NEHRP and Congress expanded the authority in the 
NEHRP in 1990 and directed FEMA to, “develop, and coordinate the execution of, 
federal interagency plans to respond to an earthquake” with specific components, which 
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will ensure the availability of adequate emergency medical resources and search and 
rescue personnel, in addition to other resources.115 
1. The Evolution of the National US&R Response System from 1990 to 
2000 
In an effort to provide an organized method and framework for the effective 
delivery of federal assistance following a major disaster, FEMA published the first 
Federal Response Plan (FRP) in 1992.116 The FRP supported implementation of the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and provided a 
structure that included twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESF’s) that could be 
activated and utilized in response to a major disaster or emergency—and ESF-9 was 
designated as “Urban Search and Rescue.”117  During this same time period, while FEMA 
was working with other federal agencies developing the FRP, they also entered into an 
agreement with the National Association for Search and Rescue (NASAR) to facilitate 
the development of a National US&R Response System that would include components 
capable of fulfilling the responsibilities delineated in ESF-9. In 1991, NASAR and a 
working group comprised of US&R subject matter experts created a solicitation for 
National task forces and assessed applicants based on criteria they had developed related 
to each agencies capability of contributing to the evolving National Search and Rescue 
Response System. Because of funding limitations in the initial years of the National 
US&R Response System, FEMA and NASAR ultimately selected 25 sponsoring agencies 
(predominantly fire departments) that had the ability to operationally and financially 
support a heavy rescue team.118  The initial chapter in the US&R system included 
extensive planning and coordination efforts—and ultimately these teams were able to 
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begin responding to federal emergencies such as hurricanes in 1992.119  Following 
analysis after the response to two significant events—the Northridge Earthquake of 1994 
and the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, FEMA expanded their Type I heavy US&R 
Task Force configuration to include planning and safety personnel.120  During this time 
period, the National Search and Rescue Response System’s budget also began to grow, 
and while appropriating additional funds for the National US&R Response System, 
Congress directed FEMA to expand the system with two additional task forces in the 
central United States—resulting in the Ohio US&R Task Force and the Missouri US&R 
Task Force joining the System in 1999. The Texas US&R Task Force later joined the 
System in 2000, bringing the total number of National task forces to the current strength 
of 28 teams across the United States.121 Each US&R task force is capable of deploying as 
a Type I with 70 personnel, or a Type III with 28 personnel.122 
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Figure 1.   National US&R Response System Task Force Locations.123 
2. The National US&R Response System: Post-9/11 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) was created by President George W. Bush and Congress in 2003—and 
DHS was given authority to direct many FEMA and federal emergency management 
functions and resources.124 With this transition, both DHS and FEMA established a 
number of strategic goals and sought to focus more on developing all-hazard response 
and recovery capabilities.125 Another significant development in 2003 was President 
Bush directing DHS to develop a new National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
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and National Response Plan (NRP) that could provide a framework for coordinating 
diverse federal agencies in preparing to deal with various all hazard threats and other 
major emergencies and, “integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, 
preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan”126   
This paradigm shift and renewed support for an all-hazards emergency management 
framework had lasting and important implications for national search and rescue 
resources. Most significantly, between 2000 and 2003, the National US&R Response 
System budget increased from $6.4 million in 2000 to over $66 million in 2003. In recent 
years (FY2009 and FY2010) Congress has appropriated roughly $32 million for the 
US&R task forces and administration of the system.127  
The events on 9/11 represent the largest domestic urban search and rescue 
operation in U.S. history prior to Hurricane Katrina disaster along the Gulf Coast in the 
late summer of 2005. All 28 National US&R task forces were deployed during the 
response to Katrina, and they are credited with assisting in the rescue of several thousand 
people while serving with a wide range of search and rescue personnel from other 
federal, state, and local agencies. The experiences during Katrina resulted in widely 
documented failures related to the government response at all levels—and this also had a 
significant impact on how the federal government now approaches the handling of 
domestic search and rescue operations.128  At the time of the Katrina event, FEMA was 
operating under the guidelines of the previous version of the NRP where ESF-9 limited 
the coordination of only “urban” search and rescue activities during Katrina and, as a 
result, FEMA was unable to effectively coordinate and integrate search and rescue assets 
from across diverse federal agencies such as DoD, the U.S. Coast Guard and the 
Department of the Interior (DOI). In 2006, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act updated the limited scope of ESF-9 by causing the definition to be expanded 
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to include a wider range of search and rescue activities and increasing FEMA’s 
coordination role and their ability to prepare for catastrophic events.129  The current 
version of ESF-9 is less rigid and addresses structural collapse, land, and 
maritime/coastal/waterborne environments.130  Since the inception of the National Urban 
Search and Rescue Response System in 1989, the FEMA US&R task forces have 
responded each year to a number of disasters including hurricanes, earthquakes and 
terrorist attacks—both domestically and internationally.131  Research demonstrates that 
the program has actively worked to evolve with the requirements and demands of the 
current all hazards environment. Prior to 9/11, FEMA US&R task forces were not 
routinely exposed to disaster environments that required working closely alongside 
military personnel. The WTC event in 2001 included multiple FEMA US&R task forces 
working alongside local responders from New York and surrounding areas, but this did 
not include an organized military search and rescue effort.  Comparatively, the search and 
rescue efforts at the Pentagon on 9/11 involved local first responders and FEMA US&R 
task forces working in a unified command posture alongside a number of other federal 
agencies including military personnel—but this was perhaps a result of the Pentagon 
being a DoD facility and having a large number of military personnel actually assigned to 
the Pentagon facility at the time of the attack, rather than a preplanned unified 
response.132  The events of 9/11 spawned sweeping changes to the way we respond to 
domestic disasters and catastrophes including the creation of the NRF and standardized 
application of NIMS.  
The Hurricane Katrina event of 2005 was an unprecedented disaster, resulting in 
local responders working alongside FEMA US&R task force personnel, state and federal 
military personnel, and a multitude of personnel from other agencies.  Although 
provisions have existed for many years that will allow federal military personnel to assist 
in some capacity during domestic disasters when local resources are overwhelmed—and 
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state National Guard troops have worked in disaster environment for many years—the 
concept of collaboration and coordination between all of these search and rescue entities 
have been widely discussed since Katrina. 133   
A key aspect of the National US&R Response framework that must be mentioned 
is the National US&R Incident Support Team (IST) component. An IST is a unit separate 
from a US&R task force that provides a group of subject matter experts and qualified 
specialists readily available for rapid assembly and deployment to a disaster area. The 
IST furnishes federal, state, and local officials with technical assistance in acquiring and 
using US&R resources. The IST is available to provide advice, incident command 
assistance, management and coordination of US&R task forces, and US&R logistics 
support.134 
Another evolving key component of FEMA disaster response is the National 
Response Coordination Center (NRCC). The NRCC is a multiagency center that is 
designed to coordinate the overall federal support for major disasters and emergencies, 
including catastrophic incidents, and also emergency management program 
implementation. The Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) maintains the NRCC—
which is staffed by National Response Coordination Staff—as a functional component of 
the National Operations Center providing incident support operations at the regional-
level. The functions of the center are explained in the FEMA National Incident Support 
Manual which was published in 2011.135  The NRCC is intended as a multiagency center 
that can coordinate the overall federal support for major disasters and emergencies, 
including catastrophic incidents and emergency management program implementation. 
DHS/FEMA maintains the NRCC with personnel from the National Response 
Coordination Staff—operating as a functional component of the National Operations 
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Center supporting incident support operations at the regional-level.136  The FEMA 
National Incident Support Manual reflects a position within the NRCC of “Department of 
Defense Specialist.” This person would be responsible for providing information 
regarding the availability of DoD’s military support capabilities “during a national 
emergency and/or natural disaster to the RSS Chief and other appropriate FEMA and 
ESF authorities.”137  The inclusion of this section and position in this support manual 
connotes the intention of FEMA to collaborate and coordinate with DoD and other 
federal resources in response to a disaster, but does not specifically discuss search and 
rescue activities. 
3. Conclusion 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency was created more than 30 years ago 
primarily for disaster response efforts related to earthquake hazards. FEMA worked with 
other federal agencies and published our first Federal Response Plan in 1992, which 
included twelve emergency support functions (ESF’s) including ESF #9 for Urban Search 
and Rescue. The National US&R Response System—which now includes 28 National 
US&R task forces—was born from this agency to provide disaster search and rescue 
capabilities at all response levels. 
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Figure 2.   Historical Timeline of the National US&R Response System138 
While the initial intent of these teams was to perform rescues in structural 
collapse situations, the expectations and capabilities of the teams have evolved. The 
events of 9/11 resulted in major budgetary increases for the National US&R Response 
System and a renewed focus on building an all-hazard response capability, while the 
government failures in the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 resulted in significant 
changes to the federal government’s perspective and approach to search and rescue 
operations. The Katrina event resulted in multiple federal agencies working alongside one 
another in the search and rescue arena without appropriate collaboration and 
coordination. Conversely, a large coordinated effort between FEMA, National Guard, and 
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Federal Military troops was utilized during the Hurricane Irene event in 2011. The 
research for this chapter found that senior level staff in the FEMA US&R response 
system structure recognizes that collaboration and coordination with other federal search 
and rescue entities is essential for success. However while this reality has been identified, 
documented, and implemented into the planning process and strategies, there is no 
indication that a national strategy has been implemented or exercised appropriately. 
Subsequent chapters will seek to identify what efforts exist within the national search and 
rescue enterprise to fully institutionalize interagency command and coordination among 
diverse federal, state, and local search and rescue resources.  
B. UNITED STATES MILITARY IN DISASTERS AND SEARCH AND 
RESCUE 
The U.S. Military consists of five active-duty Services and their respective Guard 
and Reserve units. All branches are equal parts of the United States Military—with four 
of the branches—the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army falling under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Defense (DoD).139  The Coast Guard reports to the 
Department of Homeland Security during peacetime and only reports to DoD during 
wartime. The early stages of disaster response and relief, along with civil disturbance 
efforts are the responsibility of local authorities. Once local officials have exhausted all 
resources to these efforts they can request the assistance of the state. The Governor, in 
turn, may declare a disaster and seek federal assistance once state resources are 
determined inadequate. When requested by the Governor and when authorized by the 
President, DoD may provide support to civil authorities of the federal government for its 
disaster relief and civil disturbance efforts.140  This section will discuss the role of DoD 
military resources in domestic disasters—and more specifically how they could be 
utilized in urban search and rescue situations. 
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C. UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND 
The DoD established U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in October of 
2002 to consolidate under a single unified command the existing homeland defense and 
civil support missions that were previously executed by other military organizations. As 
authorized by President George W. Bush, USNORTHCOM was established to, “provide 
command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and to 
coordinate defense support of civil authorities.”141  In this mission, USNORTHCOM has 
subordinate components in the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.142  
USNORTHCOM is colocated with NORAD headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in 
Colorado Springs.  
D. DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES 
The key component of USNORTHCOM with regard to domestic disasters and 
emergencies is their Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission.143  DSCA 
constitutes the provision of civil support as directed or requested to those governmental 
or agency-based entities in need of DoD capabilities and represents the current process by 
which the United States Military can provide assets and personnel in support of missions 
by civil authorities during a disaster or emergency.144  Although this support can include 
responses to law enforcement incidents, special events, and other domestic activities—
this section is centered on military support available during natural and man-made 
disasters.  A recent example of the use of DSCA is the military response to Hurricane 
Irene, where Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (NEPLO) deployed to 11 
different states in support of civilian authorities.145    DSCA provides overarching 
guidance of how the United States military can be requested by a federal agency and the 
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procedures that govern the actions of the military during their domestic deployment. A 
formal process has been established between FEMA and Department of Defense 
delineating how a request is made for the military to respond to a natural or manmade 
disaster. While this paper is not intended to explain detailed military doctrine and 
reimbursement requirements—it is important to note that all support provided by the 
military is required to be reimbursed by the agency that requested it. The military’s 
budget does not include providing DSCA support and reimbursement is crucial in order 
for the military to maintain the ability to conduct its primary mission.146  Although there 
are a number of applicable DoD policies, directives, plans, command and control 
relationships, and other complexities involved with regard to DoD support for domestic 
emergencies—any DoD  resources deployed in the US&R arena during a domestic 
disaster will be provided through the DSCA mission, with the intention of acting in a 
supporting agency role.147  While all of the referenced components within NORTHCOM 
are available for deployment to assist during a domestic disaster situation—the following 
section will give a brief overview of the four concerned military branches with a focus on 
only those resources that could potentially be utilized in an US&R capacity. 
E. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY BRANCHES 
Resources from the United States Air Force (USAF)—including the Air National 
Guard and the Air Reserve can be called upon during domestic disasters such as 
hurricanes, floods, and wildfires. Their mission can include humanitarian efforts, aerial 
reconnaissance and searches, aerial support for firefighting, and a number of other duties. 
This could also include the concept of employing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to 
acquire imagery for disaster research and management.148  The National Search and 
Rescue Plan (NSP) designates the USAF as the recognized “coordinator” for aeronautical 
search and rescue in the continental United States during civil search and rescue 
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operations, although they have no role in US&R missions.149 The USAF role also 
includes managing the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) located at 
Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, which ties directly into the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s alerting system and the U.S. Mission Control Center. The USAF states 
that AFRCC is the “single agency responsible for coordinating on-land federal SAR 
activities in the 48 contiguous United States, Mexico and Canada.”150  This contention is 
misleading in that disaster related roles described in the NRF and NSP reflect that 
AFRCC would be responsible for coordinating DoD activities, but not all federal SAR 
activities—such as FEMA US&R and the U. S. Coast Guard who fall under DHS 
responsibility.151  In reality, the AFRCC coordinates all inland SAR activities in the 
continental U.S., but does not directly handle SAR cases.  In a large majority of 
situations, the actual search and rescue in disasters is carried out by the Civil Air Patrol, 
state police or local first responders—including FEMA US&R teams.152 
Two branches of the armed services fall under the Department of the Navy—the 
United States Navy (USN) and the United States Marine Corps (USMC)—both military 
departments within the Department of Defense.153  The USN and the USMC have an 
active search and rescue program that includes elite Navy rescue swimmers. Although 
USN resources are available to assist during domestic disaster situations, it would be 
almost exclusively in waterborne rescue situations; it is not likely we would see Navy 
personnel being utilized for US&R missions. Resources and personnel from the USMC 
have been providing humanitarian aid for natural or man-made disasters since the early 
nineteenth century—including such activities as police support, firefighting, and disaster 
relief.154  The USMC trains for response to domestic disasters and, although US&R 
missions are not part of their training regimen or normal skill set, Marine Corps 
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personnel maintain a Chemical Biological Incident Response Force that is capable of 
casualty search and rescue. Such assets could conceivably be utilized in a number of 
US&R support roles through DSCA.155 
The Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is one component in United States Army 
that—while not accepting search and rescue missions—is directly involved in domestic 
disaster response and recovery. Since first being utilized in 1882, when they assisted with 
the Mississippi River floods, the USACE has been responding to domestic disasters as 
part of their mission—including earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, or manmade 
emergencies. They assist with rescue, relief, and recovery efforts alongside other federal, 
state, and other non-governmental organizations.156  Most other elements of the United 
States Army have not traditionally been configured and utilized for domestic disasters, 
although doctrine existed for utilization of Army assets and personnel in recovery 
following a disaster.157 More recently, Army North (the subordinate component of 
NORTHCOM) is evolving and accepting missions related to domestic disasters and 
emergencies—including unconventional Army missions such as training to fight 
catastrophic wildfires,158 and preparing for hurricane responses.159  It is conceivable that 
Army personnel will be utilized in search and rescue support roles during domestic 
disasters in the very near future. 
F. SUMMARY 
The Department of Defense is identified in the ESF #9 Search and Rescue annex 
as the entity sharing (with the Department of the Interior, National Park Service) overall 
primary agency responsibility for land SAR operations in incidents requiring a 
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coordinated federal response.160  When any of the aforementioned federal military forces 
deploy support of DSCA, they come under the operational control of NORTHCOM once 
those resources enter the incident area. NORTHCOM controls only federal forces 
deployed into the impact area—while National Guard forces deployed under the authority 
of the governor remain under control of the governor. The exception to this policy is 
when a commander has been appointed under the Dual Status Commander (DSC) 
construct, in which case a single military commander would have authority over both 
state and federal military personnel in the same operational area. While each military 
branch of DoD takes a slightly different approach to Search and Rescue (SAR) 
operations, there is some capability within each service. As discussed in the section 
related to the National US&R Response System, the FEMA National Incident Support 
Manual reflects a position within the NRCC of “Department of Defense Specialist.”  This 
is the person responsible for providing information regarding the availability of DoD’s 
military support capabilities during a national emergency and/or natural disaster.161  
FEMA clearly recognizes the need to collaborate more effectively with other federal 
agencies (including DoD) in disasters, and with the evolution of DSCA and the DSC 
construct, it is quite possible uniformed DoD personnel will be working collaboratively 
with FEMA US&R task forces in mass search and rescue operations—with US&R task 
forces functioning as subject matter experts (SME) in situations where structural 
collapses or other complex urban search and rescue scenarios are discovered. 
G. NATIONAL GUARD 
The National Guard (NG), the oldest component of the Armed Forces of the 
United States and one of the nation’s longest-enduring institutions, celebrated its 370th 
birthday on December 13, 2006. There are two general components to the National 
Guard: the Army NG and the Air NG. The National Guard doubled the size of the  
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Regular Army when it was mobilized in 1940, more than a year before Pearl Harbor, and 
contributed an additional 19 divisions to that war, as well as numerous other units, to 
include NG aviation squadrons. 162 
National Guard forces can be considered state military personnel, and are 
employed under state active duty (Title 32) status, under the command and control of the 
governor of their respective state. While under the command of the president and the 
secretary of defense, federalized military forces (Title 10 status) should coordinate 
closely with State National Guard forces to promote unity of effort. There is often much 
confusion surrounding Title 10 Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard military forces, 
but this is of little consequence when considering how they can support or participate in 
urban search and rescue operations during a disaster—as long as unity of effort can be 
achieved. 
The National Guard is mentioned liberally throughout the NRF. The terrorist 
events of September 11, 2001, brought new meaning to the concept of homeland defense 
for the National Guard. Immediately following the attack on the World Trade Center, the 
New York Army and Air National Guard mobilized over 8,000 personnel to provide 
security in the area, promptly bring in relief supplies, and to assist in the rescue and 
recovery efforts.163  The Hurricane Katrina event in 2005 marked the largest deployment 
ever of National Guard troops in response to a natural disaster. Hurricane Katrina 
devastated large areas in Louisiana and Mississippi, and the damage was exponentially 
exacerbated by the failure of levees in New Orleans. Hurricane Rita followed shortly 
thereafter, inflicting great damage to Louisiana and Texas. At the highest point, it is 
estimated that over 50,000 Army and Air Guard members responded to these domestic 
disasters.  The Army Guard participated in the rescue of thousands of civilians, primarily 
via helicopters, with hundreds more rescued in small boats. Army and Air Guard 
members from every state, territory, and the District of Columbia gave assistance to Gulf 
Coast states by virtue of State Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC). 
These are agreements that allow governors to call on neighboring states for help without 
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having to surrender control of the recovery effort to federal authorities—a concept that 
could be utilized to bolster US&R efforts in a state disaster.164  More recently, National 
Guard members have been responding more frequently to floods, fires, tornadoes, and 
other emergency situations in many states.165  The National Guard has also been engaging 
and training with local responders and US&R teams and could potentially be utilized in a 
close support role on US&R missions during a disaster.166 
Perhaps one of the most important recent agreements—developed with regard to 
the military’s ability to effectively respond to domestic emergencies—was the Joint 
Action Plan. Signed in March of 2011, the plan is intended to create a dual-status 
commander for each state, approved by the president and governor, to have simultaneous 
authority over both National Guard and Federal Reserve forces called up to respond to a 
state emergency. Under the U.S. Constitution, Guard forces must remain under state 
control for domestic events, and federal forces—whether reservists or active-duty—must 
remain in federal control. The dual-status commanders can operate in both the state and 
federal chains of command without legal changes. 
In seeking to synchronize the efforts of all the resources in a disaster search and 
rescue situation, the dual status command construct offers a mechanism for integrating 
military forces in a coordinated, efficient, and cost-effective manner. When faced with 
limited resources, “integration constructs with the best potential for success are those that 
recognize state and federal authorities inherent in our federalist system of 
government.”167  The lessons of Hurricane Katrina taught us that bickering and 
disagreements between branches and levels of the military should be worked out in 
advance, because our best chance for rescuing survivors requires effective command, 
control, and coordination between all agencies.168  The NRF emphasizes that close  
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coordination between DoD assets, other federal military, and National Guard forces in a 
response is critical,169 and goes as far as to indicate that the NG is a “crucial state 
resource, with expertise in search and rescue.”170 
The National Guard has been training with local first responders in many states 
and communities. To facilitate an effective collaboration on disaster SAR missions, these 
relationships must be fostered, and a common national strategy must be developed and 
supported with a national-level exercise related to urban search and rescue operations. 
H. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
The U.S. Military consists of five active-duty services and their respective Guard 
and Reserve units. All branches are equal parts of the United States Military—and while 
the United States Coast Guard (USCG) reports to the Department of Homeland Security 
during peacetime and reports to Department of Defense (DoD) only during wartime—the 
other four branches of the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army each fall under the 
jurisdiction of the DoD.171  
The Coast Guard is considered the nation’s “maritime first responder” and has a 
leading role in executing the National Response Framework (NRF) for disaster situations. 
The USCG maintains a wide variety of SAR resources, primarily dedicated to maritime 
SAR throughout the U.S. and its territories. Coast Guard operations are supported by an 
extensive communications network of coastal radio stations, specialized landline circuits, 
and communications centers, all of which are guided by Regional Coordination 
Centers.172  The USCG serves as the overall primary agency to accomplish the ESF #9 
mission when faced with maritime/coastal/waterborne SAR operations in incidents 
requiring a coordinated federal response.173  Although not normally considered a 
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component of US&R response, the Coast Guard was able to demonstrate their formidable 
search and rescue capabilities when Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge, levee breaks, and 
subsequent flooding necessitated one of the largest search and rescue operations in U.S. 
history. Despite an admitted lack of coordination between entities—federal search and 
rescue assets from the Coast Guard, FEMA US&R task forces, DoD, and other federal 
agencies worked in concert with state and local responders to rescue tens of thousands of 
people. Coast Guard teams alone were reported to have rescued and evacuated over 
33,000 people—over six times the number in an average year.174 
Despite the strengths the Coast Guard brings to disaster response, they do have 
some limitations that must be considered. Compared to other branches of the military, the 
Coast Guard is a small service, with only 39,000 personnel on active duty. Response to a 
major natural disaster such as Katrina severely strains their national capabilities and 
requires coordination and a balancing of risk in other geographic and mission areas. At 
the peak of Hurricane Katrina operations, over one-third of all Coast Guard aviation 
assets were reportedly deployed to the Gulf Coast.175 
While the National US&R Response System was originally created with the risk 
of structural collapse due to earthquakes in mind, the mission has evolved; response to 
hurricanes and the associated water hazards has become the more common deployment. 
With their broad complement of boats and helicopters, the Coast Guard is a unique 
partner in the search and rescue arena as SAR is one of their primary missions on a daily 
basis. Developing a cooperative and institutionalized training and operational relationship 
between the Coast Guard, FEMA US&R, and other federal agencies could be a crucial 
component to strengthening and enhancing the national search and rescue enterprise. 
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I. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
The National Park Service is a bureau of the Department of the Interior (DOI) and 
is identified in the Emergency Support Function #9 Search and Rescue Annex as the 
entity sharing (with the Department of Defense) overall primary agency responsibility for 
land SAR operations in incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.176   
Every year, thousands of search and rescue (SAR) missions are launched across 
the National Park System with missions including body recoveries, boating accidents, 
caving misadventures, climbing mishaps, and other emergencies. During 2007, the 
National Park Service reported 3,593 SAR incidents, of which approximately 136 
involved fatalities.177  The DOI is one of the participants on the NSARC. Not normally 
considered a resource that would be involved with US&R operations, the National Park 
Service is a stakeholder and could certainly be utilized if a large-scale disaster 
overwhelmed FEMA US&R resources or affected an area including national park 
property or a national monument. 
J. UNITY OF EFFORT 
In seeking to further explore how collaboration and coordination between federal, 
state, and local search and rescue resources might be improved—this review also 
examined literature surrounding unity of effort.178  The literature confirms that the Unity 
of Effort concept is integral to the idea of collaboration and coordination. In 2010, the 
DoD entered into a new partnership with State resources in what is being referred to as 
the “Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort.”179  In answering the question of 
how collaboration and coordination between SAR resources be improved, the Unity of 
Effort is one of the more salient issues. In a presentation by Michael Byrne from FEMA, 
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he indicated that “collaboration and coordination” would likely replace any preconceived 
notions of “command and control” in the complex interactions taking place between 
responders in a disaster environment.180   
In a 2010 paper on the National Guard and military reserve forces, authors John 
Nagl and Travis Sharp discussed the unity of effort concept and stated, “On the 
contentious issue of command and control, DoD leaders should continue, in coordination 
with the Council of Governors, to develop protocols allowing governors to direct federal 
forces engaged in disaster response in their states. DoD leaders should avoid getting 
dragged into unproductive jurisdictional debates and bureaucratic turf battles. Frequent 
training and exercises can provide confidence that planning for “unity of effort” is in fact 
progressing as intended.”181 This was an interesting observation in that DoD made 
progress in reconciling the barriers to effective cooperation when the Dual Status 
Command construct was enhanced in 2011.182  This concept is explored further during 
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IV. HURRICANE RESPONSE COMPARISONS 
This chapter covers the US&R response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and 
Hurricane Irene in 2011, and provides a foundation for a comparative analysis of these 
two events. 
A. US&R ACTIVITY DURING HURRICANE KATRINA—A CASE STUDY 
In order to provide the reader a better understanding of the operational strategies 
and challenges faced by the FEMA US&R Task Forces in a major disaster deployment, a 
brief overview and a case study of the response to the Hurricane Katrina event is 
provided. Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, and was the deadliest and most 
destructive Atlantic hurricane of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season. It is the costliest 
natural disaster, as well as one of the five deadliest hurricanes, in the history of the 
United States. Tragically, at least 1,836 people died in the actual hurricane and in the 
subsequent floods183 
Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge and subsequent flooding necessitated one of the 
largest disaster search and rescue operations in the nation’s history. While many heroic 
rescue efforts and thousands of successful rescue operations were performed, the 
overwhelming size and complexity of the event resulted in an overarching lack of an 
integrated search and rescue incident command. In addition to a multitude of other 
factors, the White House ultimately concluded that the Department of Homeland Security 
should lead an interagency review of current policies and procedures to ensure effective 
integration of all federal search and rescue resources and operations.184 
Elements of the National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Response System 
played a significant role in search and rescue operations during the Katrina event. 
Currently, 28 FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces operate in 19 states with the 
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heaviest concentration of 8 task forces in California. US&R task force responses are 
intended to be primarily for rescues from structural collapse, but have also included other 
activities—such as the recovery of personnel lost in the Columbia Shuttle disaster. From 
the inception of the national US&R system to the present, the task forces have responded 
to over 50 events, often in a standby status for such events as the Olympics and 
reconnaissance for possible victims in collapsed structures from hurricanes. The 
Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing in 1995, the attacks on the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon in 2001, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 represent the most extensive task 
force responses to date. Twenty-six of the 28 task forces responded to the attacks of 9/11, 
and all 28 task forces deployed to the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 
August 2005.185 
The information below provides the readers with a timeline of events related to 
the search and rescue efforts for Hurricane Katrina. 
Thursday, August 25, 2005:  Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Florida, causing 
widespread damage before moving west out into the Gulf of Mexico. A state of 
emergency was declared in Florida; while there are two FEMA US&R Task Forces in 
southern Florida, there was no federal US&R response in Florida for this hurricane. As is 
standard practice, elements of the National US&R Response System received updates on 
the hurricane, and several teams were placed on alert. 
Friday, August 26, 2005:  The FEMA US&R Program Office was monitoring 
the hurricane situation and was sending electronic updates and alerts to the elements of 
the National US&R Response System. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the 
Pentagon’s designated military force for protecting the homeland, providing defense 
support to civil authorities, and responding to “incidents of national consequence,” began 
deploying forces well before Katrina’s predicted landfall in the Gulf Coast region. 
NORTHCOM leadership dispatched military liaison and medical planning teams to 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, where they coordinated with Federal 
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Emergency Management Agency field offices. 186  The State of Louisiana also activated 
and deployed approximately 1,000 Army and Air National Guard (NG) troops. 
Saturday, August 27, 2005:  At the request of the Governor of Louisiana, 
President Bush declared a disaster under the Stafford Act clearing the way for federal 
disaster support coordinated by FEMA.187  This support included resources from the 
National US&R Response System—and three US&R Task Forces were activated and 
began the deployment process, with five more task forces being placed on alert for 
anticipated deployment to Louisiana and Mississippi. Two FEMA US&R Incident 
Support Teams (IST) were deployed and began working with state and local officials to 
set up a unified search and rescue command. 
Sunday, August 28, 2005:  Hurricane Katrina, while still in the Gulf of Mexico, 
became a Category 5 storm, and the mayor of New Orleans ordered a mandatory 
evacuation. The Louisiana Superdome was opened as a refuge and evacuation center, and 
elements of the NG—with more than 5,000 Army and Air NG now deployed—delivered 
several truckloads of water and MRE to the Superdome. 
Three (3) US&R task forces and an Incident Support Team (IST) arrived in the 
region and were promptly stationed at Barksdale Air Force Base in Shreveport, 
Louisiana. Two (2) additional US&R task forces and another IST were staged in 
Meridian, Mississippi, at the Meridian Naval Air Station, and several additional task 
forces were put on alert.188  President Bush declares State of Emergency in Mississippi, 
Florida, and Alabama. 
Monday, August 29, 2005:  On the morning of Monday, August 29, Hurricane 
Katrina made landfall in Louisiana and caused catastrophic flooding in many areas of the 
city, which was exacerbated by several levee breaches in the local canals. On this same 
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morning, several prestaged US&R task forces departed from Barksdale Air Force Base in 
route to New Orleans. The leadership and some of the task force members came to Baton 
Rouge, where they were briefed and, “programmed their radios to work on local 
frequencies, and they departed for the New Orleans area.”189  Several FEMA US&R task 
forces also arrived in Baton Rouge and met up with U.S. Coast Guard representatives and 
those from Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries, who were leading the search operations.190   
Tuesday, August 30, 2005:  The Louisiana Governor ordered a mandatory 
evacuation of all of New Orleans, including the Superdome, due to the flooding of the 
city. By the morning of August 30, eight additional US&R task forces, and eight of the 
California Swiftwater Rescue Teams were activated and en route to operations in 
Mississippi and Louisiana—although they were delayed while waiting for air 
transportation. 191 FEMA Logistics personnel began building base camps to provide 
support to several thousand responders and to provide support for helicopter rescue 
operations. 
Wednesday, August 31, 2012:  On August 31, Hurricane Katrina is downgraded 
to a tropical depression. Ten additional task forces were activated and staged to assist.192  
Eight Swiftwater Rescue Teams arrived in Louisiana and began water rescue 
operations—although reports of rampant lawlessness, especially the persistent urban 
legend of shooting at helicopters, raised concerns for personnel safety and definitely 
delayed some emergency rescue efforts.193 
Because US&R task forces came from locations across the United States, 
Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9 phased in FEMA US&R deployments; full 
strength was reached in Louisiana on August 31, 2005, and in Mississippi on September 
1, 2005. However, the majority of search and rescue personnel were not provided through 
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ESF-9. In addition to State and local first responders and volunteers, U.S. Coast Guard, 
Department of Defense, National Guard, and EMAC resources augmented search and 
rescue efforts in the affected area.194  Many US&R resources were also not coordinated 
with, or by FEMA in its role as ESF-9 coordinator. When providing ESF-9 status reports 
for DHS situation reports, FEMA reported only information concerning FEMA national 
US&R task forces. Additionally, it was learned that the National Response Coordination 
Center (NRCC) Operations Section Chief tasked the U.S. Coast Guard with rescue 
missions directly, rather than going through ESF-9 to coordinate rescue operations.195 
Thursday September 1 through September 27, 2005:  Search and rescue efforts 
by multiple agencies continued over a widespread area for many days. By September 3, 
2005, FEMA had deployed all 28 of its National Urban Search and Rescue teams—with 
7 going to Louisiana and 11 to Mississippi—to assist in rescue efforts in heavily 
impacted areas, with many being housed at commercial hotel facilities. The remaining 10 
teams were activated and deployed to staging areas in Dallas and Houston, Texas, where 
most teams were housed at commercial hotel facilities.196  By the end of operations in 
Mississippi, a total of 15 task forces had worked in the state, demobilizing on September 
10. 
While FEMA US&R task forces handled collapsed structure rescues, the majority 
of disaster rescues during the Hurricane Katrina response were water-based.  To establish 
immediate water rescue capabilities in the affected areas, FEMA relied on its support 
agencies, primarily the U.S. Coast Guard, to provide personnel and boats and helicopters 
for water-based search and rescue activities. In addition, state officials in Louisiana 
issued a request for volunteers to assist search and rescue efforts using their personal 
boats, and reportedly hundreds of volunteers responded.197 
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FEMA reported that the Katrina Unified Search and Rescue Command was made 
up of teams from 15 states: California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, and Washington. Resources came from a variety of local, state, and federal 
agencies. The teams reportedly helped more than 6,500 people reach safety in the days 
immediately after Hurricane Katrina. Teams were also credited with searching over 
22,000 structures in New Orleans, and more in other Louisiana Parishes to find trapped or 
stranded survivors. 
Urban Search and Rescue operations during Katrina were conducted to evacuate 
citizens and search structures. Under the rules of engagement established by the State of 
Louisiana, the teams carried out two types of searches: hasty/primary searches and 
secondary searches. Hasty/primary searches were carried out in Orleans parish from 
August 30 to September 12. These searches were visual, with hailing calls as searchers 
moved through areas; no forced entry was conducted into a structure without probable 
cause, with a goal of finding and evacuating victims. Secondary searches were conducted 
from September 12 through 27. These secondary searches were conducted door to door in 
affected areas where significant flooding had occurred several feet higher than the 
floor.198  All resources from the FEMA National US&R Response System were 
demobilized following the final day of searches on September 27, 2005. 
B. PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED IN THE KATRINA RESPONSE 
The prevailing theme in this case—which was noted in the earliest US&R 
deployments, and became very apparent during the Hurricane Katrina event—was the 
disconnect between federal partners in the search and rescue arena and the lack of a 
common national US&R strategy that could effectively bring together available search 
and rescue resources. For example, a bipartisan committee created to investigate the 
response to Hurricane Katrina found that “search and rescue operations were a 
tremendous success,” but coordination and integration between the military services, the 
National Guard, the Coast Guard, and other local, state, and federal rescue organizations 
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was severely lacking.199 Less than two months after the Katrina event, a military 
commander from NORTHCOM testified that during the first four days of the response, 
“no single organization or agency was in charge of providing a coordinated effort for 
rescue operations.”200  In considering the marked lack of collaboration and coordination 
between the military entities and the FEMA US&R task forces during the Katrina event, 
the questions—of whether the teams could have been used more effectively and 
efficiently, were other strategies available for adapting to the situation, and what other 
disciplines could have been integrated with the US&R task forces to improve their 
mission capabilities—are highlighted. The lack of collaboration and coordination 
between search and rescue assets also resulted in poor unity of effort. In discussing the 
response to Katrina, a senior FEMA response official explained, “Unity of effort and 
unity of command are both principles of war, and important operational features of 
successful military command and control relationships; this would also be true in a 
disaster response in which military forces are involved.”201 This notion of poor 
collaboration and unity of effort during the Katrina response was a recurring topic in the 
literature and case study. 
The case study also revealed that in the initial days of the Katrina event, 
NORTHCOM was leaning forward and began deploying forces well before Katrina’s 
predicted landfall in the Gulf Coast region. Military liaison officers and medical planning 
teams were dispatched to several states and coordinated with Federal Emergency 
Management Agency field offices—but no strategy had been developed for coordinating 
their efforts with the US&R task forces—either on the FEMA side or the NORTHCOM 
side.202  The absence of a well-developed strategic plan hindered these diverse 
organizations from integrating in the US&R mission and likely prevented the teams from 
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being used more effectively and efficiently in the disaster environment. At the time of the 
Katrina event, the FEMA National US&R Response System had yet to develop a 
strategic plan or other policy that would recommend augmenting their search and rescue 
efforts with assets from other response organizations. Further, NORTHCOM was still 
relatively new in 2005 and—although the DSCA concept existed—there was no evidence 
found in the literature or this case study to suggest the military ever considered a 
collaborative disaster search and rescue strategy with FEMA in the construct of the NRP 
or ESF-9.203 
This case study also noted that active duty military troops with Joint Task Force-
Katrina arrived in New Orleans on September 1, 2005, to support evacuation efforts from 
the Superdome. Coordination between FEMA and Joint Task Force-Katrina was found to 
be lacking as several FEMA officials were unaware of Joint Task Force-Katrina’s 
presence in the response arena until federal troops physically began arriving. This case 
found that during the early stages of their involvement, troops appeared to act 
independently, sometimes resulting in duplication of efforts, as when different search and 
rescue task forces searched the same area multiple times.204  Literature sources also 
revealed that a lack of communications and situational awareness was reported to have 
“paralyzed command and control” for many responders during the Katrina event.205  
Conversely, supplemental sources reveal that communication capabilities in other areas 
was bolstered by DoD resources—where in addition to possessing operational personnel 
in large numbers that have been trained and equipped for their missions, “DoD brought 
robust communications infrastructure, logistics, and planning capabilities.”206  This DoD 
communications infrastructure could potentially have served to enhance the mission 
capabilities of the FEMA US&R task forces—and improved their adaptability and  
 
                                                 
203 At the time of the Katrina event in 2005, the U.S. was still operating under the NRP—until the 
implementation of the National Response Framework (NRF) in 2008. 
204 DHS Office of Inspector General, “A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management 
Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina,” OIG 06-32 (March 2006), 64. 
205 “A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,” (February 15, 2006), 3.  
206 “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,” (February 2006), 54. 
 67
effectiveness if a strategy existed in 2005 that would have allowed them to integrate and 
collaborate with DoD resources and the other federal entities with search and rescue 
capabilities. 
At the time of the Katrina event, ESF-9 only related to US&R in the context of 
structural collapse incidents—and there was no existing strategic plan to guide 
coordination and interaction between the National US&R Response System resources and 
other search and rescue entities. The case study and literature revealed that this created a 
conundrum because other search and rescue assets were not being coordinated by FEMA 
as the majority of search and rescue personnel were not provided through the construct of 
ESF-9.207  In addition to state and local first responders and volunteers, U.S. Coast 
Guard, Department of Defense, National Guard (NGB), and EMAC resources did 
ultimately augment search and rescue efforts in the affected area, but this was not a 
centrally coordinated effort.208   
The federal response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted various challenges in the 
use of military capabilities during domestic incidents. For instance, limitations under 
federal law and DoD policy caused the active duty military to be dependent on requests 
for assistance. These limitations resulted in a slowed application of DoD resources during 
the initial response. Further, active duty military and National Guard operations were not 
coordinated and served two different bosses: the president and the governor.209  This lack 
of a command strategy prevented all the search and rescue partners in the Katrina event 
arena from coordinating effectively. 
This case study also revealed that in 2005, the relationships and agreements 
FEMA had with the transportation entities (DoD), which they relied upon, were not 
sufficient. This case found that during the Katrina event, eight Swiftwater Rescue teams 
from California were delayed in their arrival at the event due to transportation issues—
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and when questioned about such delays, officials explained that the DoD approval 
process sometimes required 24 to 48 hours, creating delays for life-saving and life-
sustaining missions.210   
This case and the literature show that during the Katrina rescue operations, 
FEMA’s national US&R task forces worked under difficult conditions performing 
thousands of successful rescue missions, many of them water-based, even though FEMA 
has no existing capability for performing water rescues. Reports indicate that the FEMA 
US&R task forces collaborated with the Louisiana State Wildlife and Fisheries 
Department who organized boats for US&R personnel use—and the teams are credited 
with rescuing more than 6,000 survivors in Mississippi and Louisiana during the Katrina 
operation.211  The water-based rescue operations carried out by the U.S. Coast Guard, 
FEMA US&R task forces and many other agencies in the New Orleans area may be one 
of the largest life-saving efforts in history—a combined local, state, and federal team 
effort.212  While FEMA US&R teams were reported to have handled collapsed structure 
rescues with success, the overwhelming majority of disaster rescues during the Hurricane 
Katrina response were water-based. Following Katrina, the DHS Office of Inspector 
General noted that the US&R teams need increased water rescue capabilities if they were 
going to be more responsive to future catastrophic events that involve large-scale 
flooding and the mass evacuation of stranded persons.213 
C. THE US&R RESPONSE TO HURRICANE IRENE—CASE STUDY 
In an effort to give the reader a better understanding of the US&R response and 
the activities of cooperating agencies for Hurricane Irene—and to assist in determining 
whether strategies for using US&R assets have evolved and improved in the past several 
years—the following brief overview and case study are provided. Hurricane Irene was a 
large, destructive tropical cyclone that affected much of the Caribbean and East Coast of 
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the United States during the 2011 Atlantic hurricane season—making landfall on the 
banks of North Carolina on August 27, 2011. Although Irene remained a hurricane over 
land, it weakened to a tropical storm while making several landfalls affecting 
southeastern New Jersey and New York City on August 28, and then Irene transitioned 
back to a tropical cyclone near the Vermont/New Hampshire border early on August 29, 
before dissipating early in the morning on August 30. Throughout its path, Irene caused 
widespread destruction, at least 56 deaths, and several billion dollars in damage—
ultimately becoming the fifth costliest hurricane in United States history.214 
Thursday August 25, 2011:  As is standard practice in anticipation of an event, 
elements of the National US&R Response System began receiving electronic updates on 
the hurricane, and several US&R teams received alert status orders from FEMA. 
Friday August 26, 2011:  In anticipation of Irene, President Obama signed a 
predisaster emergency declaration for the States of Virginia, Massachusetts, and New 
York on August 26. The Department of Defense began providing support to the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) efforts to prepare for Hurricane Irene’s 
expected landfall on the U.S. mainland. Initial support included air and ground 
transportation experts and defense coordinating officers and elements who serve as DoD 
representatives to state, local and other federal agencies—experts who are responsible for 
coordinating DoD resources in support of FEMA. Additionally, 18 DoD helicopters were 
deployed to the Northeastern United States to be ready to provide critical life-saving and 
life sustaining support should it be needed. The aircraft pre-positioned close enough to 
render swift assistance, but intentionally staged out of the way of the Irene’s path.215   
Saturday, August 27, 2011:  Hurricane Irene made landfall on the Outer Banks 
of North Carolina. Defense Department officials announced the appointment of four dual-
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status commanders to support Hurricane Irene relief efforts, marking the first time the 
dual-commander concept has been implemented for a natural disaster.216 
FEMA also proactively positioned a total of 18 Incident Management Assistance 
Teams along the coast to coordinate with state, tribal and local officials related to disaster 
response and recovery. Six (6) National US&R task forces and one (1) Incident Support 
Team (IST), comprised of more than 500 personnel were activated and predeployed in 
the region in the event that search and rescue support would be needed.217  While some of 
the US&R Task Forces and IST predeployed to commercial hotel facilities—where they 
maintained operational readiness and monitored news reports—others such as Ohio Task 
Force 1 were predeployed to military bases.218  Additionally, the DoD positioned defense 
coordinating officers at FEMA’s national response coordination center in Washington 
D.C., and in FEMA regional response coordination centers (RCC) in Boston, New York 
City, Philadelphia, and Atlanta to support and coordinate any requests for defense assets 
and personnel.219 
When it became evident that Irene would make landfall over New York City as a 
Category One Hurricane, the New York City Office of Emergency Management activated 
its Coastal Storm Shelter Plan. A key aspect of this plan is their Unified Operations and 
Resource Center (UORC), an interagency task force led by NYC Department of 
Homeless Services and NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM). The UORC 
operated from a stand-alone facility established when the shelter plan was activated so 
that the massive coordination effort required for the emergency shelter system could run 
on a parallel basis with the NYC Emergency Operations Center (EOC) without diverting 
personnel from other storm-related operations.220 
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Sunday, August 28, 2011:  Early on August 28, Hurricane Irene’s outskirts 
reached New Jersey and New York City and caused flash flooding in New Jersey. In the 
very early hours of the morning, the hurricane was reported as a Category 1 storm with 
wind strength up to 75 mph.  
The National Guard’s contribution to the joint state and federal support for civil 
authorities responding to Hurricane Irene was bolstered by activation of the newly 
created National Guard Bureau’s 24/7 National Guard Coordination Center in Arlington, 
Virginia. Approximately 7,600 National Guard Airmen and Soldiers from 18 states, the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico responded Aug. 28 to support Hurricane Irene relief 
efforts. They flew helicopters from Alaska, Florida, Mississippi, New Mexico and Ohio 
to stand by in the affected region for search and rescue—and performed high-water 
search and rescue missions in Connecticut. More than 100 New York National Guard 
members are credited with traveling in speed boats to help rescue 21 people stranded by 
floodwaters in an upstate New York hotel.221  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 
Temporary Emergency Power mission deployed power teams to Incident Support Bases 
in several states in anticipation of large area power outages.222 
Monday, August 29, 2011:  Several National US&R teams were deployed and 
assisting in search and rescue. National US&R Massachusetts Task Force 1 was involved 
in conducting wide area search operations on August 29 after being requested and 
arriving in the state of Vermont.223  National US&R task forces from Pennsylvania and 
Ohio were assisting the state of New York with search and rescue.224 
Mobile Emergency Response System (MERS) assets were pre-positioned in 
disaster affected areas to support emergency response communications needs. Upon 
request of the state of Vermont, FEMA established a staging area at Camp Johnson 
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(Colchester, VT.) to support federal response operations. Additionally, in coordination 
with the DoD, FEMA designated Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Westover Army Reserve 
Base in Massachusetts and Joint Base McGuire-Dix in New Jersey as Incident Support 
Bases to support federal operations to support states’ responses to Irene.225   
Tuesday, August 30, 2011:  FEMA US&R task forces continued to provide 
search and rescue support in Vermont and New York, with Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco 
and Firearms and Explosives (ATF) agents providing escort and force protection.226  The 
U.S. Forest Service mobilized chain-saw personnel within Vermont to cut and remove 
debris from blocked roadways facilitating access for response personnel.227  States, 
localities and the Red Cross opened more than 150 shelters in eight states as local 
evacuation orders went into effect—and approximately 13,000 residents reportedly used 
the shelters.228 
Wednesday August 31 through Friday, September 2, 2011:  More than 4,000 
National Guard personnel, activated by Governors of the affected states, assist states with 
response efforts. In those states already being affected by the hurricane, National Guard 
forces assisted state and local authorities as they began performing cleanup, 
communication, and continue necessary search and rescue missions. During this period, 
recovery efforts were under way all across the region, and the US&R task forces were 
systematically demobilized and returned to their home bases.  
This case study of the response to the Hurricane Irene event revealed a US&R 
response strategy that appears to have worked effectively. Although there were some 
sources that reported the government response to Hurricane Irene was overhyped, the 
resultant damage and destruction would indicate the response—including resources 
                                                 
225 “FEMA And Federal Partners Continue Supporting Irene Recovery in Impacted Areas,” Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (August 31, 2011).  
226 Darrel Wilt, “Hurricane Irene 2011 After Action Report,” Ohio Task Force 1 (October 25, 2011), 
7. Note: ATF is an agency within the Department of Justice. 
227 “Irene: Overview of Federal Family’s Preparations and Response,” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (September 4, 2011).  
228 “Irene Update,” Federal Emergency Management Agency Blog, (August 27, 2011).  
 73
intended for search and rescue—were appropriate.229  FEMA actually received accolades 
for the preparation and response to the Irene event.230  Taking this information, this case 
study of the response to the Hurricane Irene event will be analyzed and compared 
alongside the case study related to the Hurricane Katrina event to determine variations 
and effectiveness of US&R response strategies, how the teams were used during the 
missions, and whether they effectively integrated, collaborated, or coordinated with other 
disciplines and entities during the event. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
This chapter provides an analysis and review formulated from the information and 
data gleaned from the previous chapters—including key research documents and sources 
outlined in the background, literature review, methodology section—and perhaps most 
importantly, the Katrina and Irene cases studies. From this analysis, several themes 
emerged in consideration of the questions: 
1. Can the FEMA US&R teams be used more effectively in the Homeland 
Security Enterprise (HSE)? 
2. Are there other strategies that would allow the US&R resources to be 
more adaptable in the HSE? 
3. Can other disciplines be integrated with the US&R task forces to improve 
their mission capabilities in the disaster arena? 
A. COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION WITH MILITARY 
RESOURCES 
The case study and literature about Hurricane Katrina identified a disconnect 
between federal partners in the search and rescue arena and the lack of a common 
national US&R strategy that could effectively bring together available search and rescue 
resources. Conversely, from the case study of the response for Hurricane Irene, we 
learned that the DoD was collaborating with and began providing support to the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) efforts on August 26, 2011, in preparation 
for Hurricane Irene's expected landfall on the U.S. mainland. The first levels of support 
included air and ground transportation experts, and defense coordinating officers and 
experts who are specifically responsible for coordinating DoD resources in support of 
FEMA. Additionally, the case study related to the Irene event taught us that DoD 
prestaged a large number of helicopters to the Northeastern United States to support the 
FEMA response if needed.231  There are several examples of new strategies with direct 
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coordination between the DoD and FEMA in anticipation of Irene making landfall; this 
type of coordination and collaboration makes the US&R task forces more adaptable and 
effective in the disaster environment. In wide-area search operations, the number of 
FEMA US&R personnel is limited. Partnering with military entities that could augment 
the operation with potentially several thousand personnel, vehicles, and aircraft creates a 
strategy where US&R missions can be conducted more efficiently and expeditiously. By 
the time of the Irene event in 2011, the ESF-9 annex had been redefined and other search 
and rescue partners, including DoD and NGB, were now collectively being coordinated 
by FEMA. Having a central coordination point for search and rescue operations is crucial 
and the changes that were made since Katrina—including the modification of ESF-9, the 
appointment of a Dual Status Commander for military assets, and the promotion of unity 
of effort through unified command—allowed the US&R task forces to be used more 
effectively during the response to Hurricane Irene in 2011. 
Following this criticism after Katrina, the concept of military Dual Status 
Command (DSC) evolved, allowing one commander to command both federal (Title 10) 
and state forces (National Guard in Title 32 and/or State Active Duty status) with the 
consent of a state governor, and the authorization of the president. This is intended as a 
centralized command and control construct to provide both the federal and state chains of 
command with a common operating picture from the perspective of the DSC—and 
facilitates unity of effort from all assigned forces.232  A notable action found in the case 
study of Irene was that Defense Department officials employed a strategy of appointing 
four dual-status commanders to support Hurricane Irene relief efforts, marking the first 
time the dual-commander concept has been implemented for a natural disaster. 233  The 
DSC construct creates unity of effort between military assets in the disaster 
environment—and those assets were integrating and collaborating with FEMA US&R 
personnel, which created a more adaptable and effective search and rescue framework. 
The research for the case study of Irene also revealed that the DoD positioned 
defense coordinating officers at FEMA's national response coordination center in 
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Washington D.C., and in FEMA regional response coordination centers (RCC) in several 
major cities to support and coordinate any requests for defense assets and personnel.234  
The Irene response efforts also reflected NORTHCOM is now embracing their mission of 
coordinating and providing active-duty defense support to civil authorities.235  A senior 
FEMA official noted, after the Katrina event in 2005, that when active duty Title 10 
forces are needed in a given state to assist in disaster response, a DoD representative 
should be a full member in the Unified Command leadership. The Irene response in 2011 
demonstrated that the federal partners have clarified many of the issues regarding 
interface between FEMA, the National Guard and NORTHCOM.236 
A comprehensive review of the National US&R Response System was completed 
in 2012, and one of the findings was that improvements are needed in some policy and 
operational areas that affect the entire System’s ability to carry out its mission—including 
enhancing the coordination with other federal search and rescue partners, and further 
development of nontraditional team configurations.237 Further, the review team 
recommended that the FEMA US&R policy office should institutionalize strategies and 
mechanisms that will deepen coordination with other response partners that have 
significant capabilities or interests in search and rescue operations—especially during 
large or catastrophic events—and this would certainly include DoD and NGB.238  This 
analysis found that policymakers within FEMA and DoD apparently recognize this 
potential, and recently developed US&R strategic plans from both entities make 
consideration for the use of DoD personnel as augmentees in disaster search and rescue 
operations.239  Case information and literature related to Katrina indicates that search and 
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rescue capabilities were plentiful and robust amongst the various stakeholders during the 
2005 hurricane, but there was no coordinated strategy for catastrophic search and 
rescue—and the US&R enterprise seemed to be viewing each of the agencies’ search and 
rescue capability as an object rather than the larger system, or looking at the nodes rather 
than the network.240  By the time Hurricane Irene arrived in 2011, FEMA was operating 
under the NRF and a revised search and rescue annex, allowing more influence and 
effectiveness in coordinating SAR activities. Also, the military had become a much more 
active partner in the domestic disaster search and rescue environment with increased 
understanding of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and the implementation 
of the Dual Status Commander concept. 
An additional relevant factor found within the research was that during a disaster 
such as Katrina, commercial facilities in the immediate disaster area are oftentimes not 
available due to non-functioning infrastructure. Also, military installations can offer 
significant advantages, with security, available runways  and heliports, open space for 
communications, and establishment of a Base of Operations.241  During the Katrina event 
on August 28, 2005, the first three FEMA US&R task forces and an IST arriving in the 
region were promptly stationed at Barksdale Air Force Base in Shreveport, Louisiana; 
two additional US&R task forces and another IST were staged in at the Meridian Naval 
Air Station in Mississippi.242  The case study revealed that during the Irene event, FEMA 
established a staging area at Camp Johnson in Vermont to support federal response operations—
and in coordination with the DoD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Westover Army Reserve Base in 
Massachusetts, and Joint Base McGuire-Dix in New Jersey were designated as Incident Support 
Bases to support federal operations to support states' responses to Irene.243 
Although commercial hotel facilities were widely utilized by US&R personnel 
during many past deployments, as well as both the Katrina and Irene events, the apparent 
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positive trend of using military installations as a base for US&R teams may have gained 
more attention following the response to Hurricane Katrina. While the response to the 
WTC attacks in 2001 was one of the largest deployments of US&R task forces in the 
history of the program, the teams used the Jacob Javitz Convention Center in midtown 
Manhattan as their base of operations—far from any military facility. In addition to the 
benefits of using military bases mentioned above, colocating with DoD and NGB 
resources could offer an opportunity to foster interdisciplinary relationships and to build 
trust with search and rescue partners that will help lead toward unity of effort in the 
actual mission environment. 
B. REFINING CORE MISSION 
In the investigations that followed the Katrina event, the Chief of the Operations 
Branch in the Response Division at the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
testified: 
Under very difficult circumstances, members of FEMA’s Urban Search 
and Rescue Program rose to the occasion, working outside the scope of 
their regular mission, although well within the authority of the Stafford 
Act, and Urban Search and Rescue provided guidance and leadership to 
State and local personnel and volunteers who were organizing their 
response in this effort.244   
The analysis of information related to many past responses found that members of 
the US&R task forces have proven to be adaptable and have worked effectively in a 
multitude of mission environments. While literature indicates the original impetus for 
creation of the National US&R program came in the late 1980s after a series of severe 
earthquakes in California, Mexico, and other locations throughout the world—and the 
intent was a team that could perform complex structural collapse rescue operations—a 
mere 2 percent of the responses in the history of the US&R program have been as a result 
of earthquakes. More than 70 percent of the overall responses have been for hurricanes, 
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floods and storm events.245  The Katrina and Irene hurricanes involved very few 
structural collapse missions, and the research shows that limiting the US&R teams to the 
original mission intent of structural collapse is not an effective or efficient strategy.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Number of National US&R Response System Deployments by Incident 
Type 1991–2010.246 
The NRF is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards response and the 
prevailing expectation seems to be—based on analysis of historical data—that FEMA 
US&R task forces are an all-hazard response resource. The analysis reflects that over the 
past 20 years, the mission of the teams has evolved to include deployments to hurricanes, 
national special security events, terror attacks, severe storms, tornadoes, and floods. Since 
the core mission is no longer simply structural collapse, refining the written policies and 
guidelines regarding the use of urban search and rescue task forces would be a more 
effective and efficient strategy.  
                                                 
245 “Review of the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System,” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, (March 2012), 27. 
246 Image and statistics retrieved from the “Review of the National Urban Search and Rescue 
Response System,” Federal Emergency Management Agency (March 2012), 27. 
 81
C. RELATIONSHIPS AND AGREEMENTS WITH TRANSPORTATION 
ENTITIES 
This analysis also found that during the Katrina event, eight Swiftwater Rescue 
teams from California were delayed in their arrival at the event due to transportation 
issues. When questioned about such delays, officials explained that the DoD approval 
process sometimes required a couple of days.247  Having an established relationship and 
deepened coordination with military partners such as DoD and NGB could eliminate 
hurdles in obtaining access to military aircraft required by the FEMA US&R teams when 
ground transportation is not an option from the point of departure, if multiple teams are 
coming from various locations throughout the country, or if FEMA is competing for 
aircraft with events such as active military conflicts overseas. While this was not an issue 
during the Irene event in 2011—because the FEMA US&R task forces were from within 
the affected region and used ground transportation—the 2012 review of the National 
US&R Response System found that FEMA should take steps to foster enhanced 
coordination with military liaisons to improve access to appropriate aircraft and incident 
vehicles for US&R task forces traveling by air.248  Additionally, a goal of improved 
relationships with federal and military agencies providing air support—including the 
Department of Transportation, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Department of Defense—is a component mentioned in the latest FEMA US&R strategic 
planning process.249  During disaster situations, the number of lives saved can be directly 
correlated to the time it takes rescuers to arrive in the disaster arena and conduct search 
and rescue operations. Since FEMA US&R task forces rely predominantly on military 
aircraft for their air transportation needs, an improved relationship and coordination 
between the entities—similar to the dynamic witnessed during the Irene event—will 
allow the US&R resources to interact more effectively with military partners and be 
transported in a more timely and efficient manner. 
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D. US&R STRATEGIC GROUP FOR EVOLVING LANDSCAPE 
The comparison between the US&R response Katrina event and the Irene event 
reflected several changes in strategy. During the Katrina event, ESF-9 was intended only 
for coordination of US&R components, and this narrowly defined policy adversely 
affected the ability for unity of effort between all the partners in the search and rescue 
arena. The updated version of ESF-9, which was implemented after Katrina, makes 
FEMA the coordinator of all search and rescue resources when a disaster has been 
declared. This change has spawned new strategies for coordination between FEMA, 
DoD, and NGB in the concept of operations for US&R missions. The research shows that 
the original US&R concept of performing rescues from structural collapse during 
earthquakes has evolved, and the number and type of agencies in the Homeland Security 
Enterprise has changed as well. The mission and search and rescue needs have changed. 
FEMA developed a strategic planning component to develop a US&R Strategic Plan and 
a US&R Strategic Training Plan—with the training plan having been published in 2010, 
and the final version of the overall strategic plan due in late 2012. This analysis found it 
reasonable to deduce that creation of a strategic planning workgroup and the associated 
strategic plans demonstrate that FEMA leadership is cognizant of the changing landscape 
and are working toward maintaining a proactive and contemporary perspective of the 
national urban search and rescue environment. 
E. NEW CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS FOR US&R IN WATER 
ENVIRONMENTS 
While the National US&R Response System has expanded their equipment cache 
since the Hurricane Katrina response to include water-related protective gear for all task 
force members, it still maintains a policy where swiftwater search and rescue is not an 
identified requirement or capability of the federal US&R mission—a responsibility 
generally tasked to the U.S. Coast Guard.250  This analysis indicates that responses for the 
FEMA US&R task forces are commonly associated with water-saturated environments 
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and both case studies herein were related to hurricane events. Therefore, while the policy 
indicates swiftwater operations are not a capability, history would indicate the task forces 
would routinely be operating in water-saturated environments. Rather than argue 
semantics, FEMA should mandate additional training, equipment, and/or clarified policy 
in order for the task forces to safely and effectively perform their core mission of 
structural collapse search and rescue during incidents that involve water—a concept and 
strategy that is supported by the 2012 review of the National US&R System and the 
ongoing strategic planning process.251  
F. NO MECHANISM FOR SHARING AAR OR LESSONS LEARNED 
Although the National US&R Response System  requires after action reports from 
each of the teams following an event—and these reports were accessed and relied upon 
for the 2012 review of the system and in the strategic planning process—the system lacks 
a mechanism for sharing the after action reports with other personnel across the national 
structure. The system has evolved dramatically since its inception—and the analysis 
revealed a robust strategic planning process—yet there is no centralized portal that would 
make after action reports and lessons learned available to the personnel on the 28 task 
forces across the nation. The events on 9/11 both in New York and at the Pentagon 
resulted in a large number of teams being deployed. The case study of Hurricane Katrina 
deployments indicate elements of every team in the system were deployed, but there was 
no overarching report of lessons learned by each of the teams. The research for this 
endeavor found no system or mechanism that would allow the several thousand partners 
in the National Search and Rescue Response System to review the after action reports 
from the team components following a deployment. 
A number of benefits could be recognized with a formalized process for sharing 
the reports within the national framework. After action reviews can be a form of 
knowledge management system, offering candid insights into specific incident 
operations, system strengths and weaknesses from various perspectives. They can also be 
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a source for feedback and insight critical to mission-focused training. Sharing these 
reviews could ultimately contribute to making the US&R teams more adaptable and 
effective in the Homeland Security Enterprise.  
The next chapter will explore how several aspects of this analysis can translate to 
a more contemporary strategy that could lead to a more effective and efficient use of 














VI. PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION 
The final chapter of this thesis presents several suggestions for how the FEMA 
Urban Search and Rescue teams can be used more effectively and efficiently in the 
Homeland Security Enterprise, along with questions for the future and a conclusion.  
Analysis of the literature and the case studies has exposed several areas where 
improvements can be made, which would contribute to enhancing the US&R program 
effectiveness and adaptability in the HSE. The review of the FEMA National Urban 
Search and Rescue Response System reveals a system that was originally built upon the 
vision of a national capability for search and rescue in structural collapse situations—but 
a system that has evolved and is now called upon for a much wider range of missions in 
the all-hazard paradigm of today’s Homeland Security Enterprise. While the original 
impetus for creation of the US&R teams was earthquakes, very few responses over the 
past 20 years were a result of earthquakes. Meanwhile, an overwhelming majority of 
deployments have been for hurricanes, tropical storms, and other natural disasters.252 
A. PROPOSED NEW STRATEGY 
In order for the FEMA US&R resources to be better utilized in the HSE, a new 
strategy is proposed, one that will allow the US&R teams to move away from 
specialization while recognizing, coordinating, and integrating with the many other 
partners in the larger national search and rescue system. This proposed new strategy 
would include the following components: 
• Deepened cooperation and coordination with DoD and other search and 
rescue partners 
• Revised and broadened core mission 
• Improved relationships and agreements with transportation providers 
• Ongoing US&R strategic planning and training element 
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• Improved concepts and training for US&R in water environments 
• Mechanism for sharing deployment information and lessons learned  
Although multiple search and rescue partners exist at the local and state level, 
perhaps the largest partners FEMA must continue to build relationships with is the United 
States Military and National Guard. During Hurricane Katrina, the Army, National 
Guard, Coast Guard, and FEMA US&R each participated in the search and rescue 
response; however, the lack of coordination and collaboration resulted in a largely 
dysfunctional effort. The White House report following Hurricane Katrina indicated the 
Department of Homeland Security should lead an interagency review of current policies 
and procedures to ensure effective integration of all federal search and rescue assets in a 
disaster.253  The response to the Katrina event ultimately demonstrated that our national 
search and rescue strategy did not appropriately consider the alignment of various 
disparate components within the broader national response system. 
The creation of USNORTHCOM in 2002 and the enhanced effort in supporting 
the homeland security enterprise through DSCA has placed the federal military into a 
position of increased value if appropriately leveraged by FEMA in the domestic US&R 
environment. Additionally, the Dual Status Commander concept that was finalized in 
2010 and effectively utilized during Hurricane Irene brings unity of effort between 
federal and state military forces. The case study for Hurricane Irene showed that each of 
these partners recognize the value of the other in the larger system. They collaborated and 
coordinated their efforts together in the Irene response where DoD had a role in the 
Unified Command process. They also took steps to pre-position Defense Coordinating 
Officers at FEMA's national response coordination center in Washington D.C., and in 
FEMA regional response coordination centers (RCC) in several major cities to support 
and coordinate any requests for defense assets and personnel.254  One of the key priorities 
identified in the latest US&R Strategic Training Plan was the need for cooperative 
training relationships with the Department of Defense (DoD) and other SAR partner 
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organizations.255  This improved cooperation has proven effective, and this should be a 
component of a new strategy that will allow FEMA to take advantage of shared goals, 
aligned capabilities, and mutual training opportunities with the military and other search 
and rescue partners.256 
The original intent of a national specialized resource to be utilized solely for 
structural collapse capability is a vision that has never been recognized. The history 
shows that the FEMA US&R teams rarely encounter rescue scenarios in structural 
collapse situations—but the teams have nonetheless evolved into a diverse and adaptable 
multi-hazard search and rescue resource in today’s all-hazard disaster environment. 
FEMA states that urban search and rescue is considered a "multi-hazard" discipline, as 
the task forces can hypothetically be utilized for response to a variety of emergencies or 
disasters, “including earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms and tornadoes, floods, 
dam failures, technological accidents, terrorist activities, and hazardous materials 
releases.”257  While ESF-9 was originally intended for only structural collapse US&R 
resources, the updated version in the NRF sought to recognize other federal search and 
rescue partners in the categories of maritime/coastal/waterborne, and land search and 
rescue. However, the large-scale disasters over the past several years have revealed that 
the lines between these categories are often blurred, making it difficult to delineate 
mission responsibility—and often resulting in overlap and duplication of effort. The core 
mission of the FEMA US&R teams has been much more than structural collapse US&R 
over the past 20 years—including a wide range of natural and man-made disasters—and 
the core mission should be revised and broadened to reflect their true capability as a 
flexible multi-hazard discipline. FEMA US&R should move away from specialization in 
the new strategy—while still maintaining the structural collapse capability. 
Additionally—while focusing on better coordination and unity of effort with other search  
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and rescue partners—they should consider a possible role in other types of missions such 
as reconnaissance and assessment, initiating the sheltering of survivors, advance recovery 
operations, and humanitarian efforts.  
During disaster situations, the number of lives saved is correlated to the time it 
takes rescuers to arrive in the disaster arena and conduct search and rescue operations. 
FEMA US&R teams are spread out across the United States, and when deployed beyond 
land travel range, they rely predominantly on military aircraft for their air transportation 
needs. This type of arrangement has resulted in delays in the past, such as the delays 
experienced by multiple California swiftwater rescue teams in traveling to the Katrina 
event. An improved relationship and coordination between FEMA US&R and the 
military partners would result in unity of effort—as demonstrated during the Irene 
event—and allow the US&R resources to be transported in a more timely and efficient 
manner. 
The literature shows that the national US&R capability has been considered in 
strategic planning for several years.  The DHS Strategic Plan for 2004 included an 
objective to provide robust all-hazard response capability from different resources, 
including urban search and rescue.258  One of the four top goals in the 2011–2014 FEMA 
Strategic Plan was to “Build Unity of Effort and Common Strategic Understanding 
among the Emergency Management Team.”259  However, the strategic planning process 
and resulting documents for the US&R component were lacking in the past—and this 
component seems to have been ignited with the arrival of the new FEMA administrator 
and his team in May of 2009. Three key strategic documents outline the latest vision and 
mission of the National US&R Response System. 
• National US&R Response System Strategic Training Plan 2011–2015 
(December 2010) 
 
• Review of the National US&R Response System (March 2012) 
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• National US&R Response System Strategic Plan 2012–2016 (Draft #8 – 
January 2012) 
Much of the work behind these strategic guidance documents comes from 
members in the US&R Response System who participate as volunteers on various 
workgroups. The disaster environment is dynamic, and search and rescue strategies must 
evolve to meet the needs of the environment and the stakeholders. The strategic plans are 
valuable and contribute to a shared vision, and the strategic planning and training 
workgroups should be a permanent component in the new strategy for the US&R 
Response System. 
The FEMA US&R teams regularly work in water-inundated environments. There 
is a notable distinction between US&R operations in a waterborne environment and 
“swiftwater rescue” operations. US&R operations conducted in water-inundated or 
waterborne environments are just that—while swiftwater rescue is considered a 
specialized skill that requires specific training and equipment.260  The history of 
responses for FEMA US&R team reflects that more than 70 percent of the overall 
deployments have been for hurricanes, floods, and storm events.261  Improved concepts 
and training for US&R in water environments should be a component of the new strategy 
going forward. 
FEMA requires an after action review document as part of the reimbursement 
process when US&R teams have been deployed. However, there is no formalized process 
for appreciative inquiry or sharing the lessons learned from the after action review 
documents with other teams across the National US&R Response System—and there has 
never been a portal for access to specific mission information related to the hundreds of 
US&R team deployments since the system was created. After action reviews can offer 
candid insights into specific incident operations, system strengths and weaknesses from 
various perspectives. They can also be a source for feedback and information critical to 
mission-focused training—and would give the teams the ability to measure the 
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appropriateness of the missions or to gauge the overall effectiveness of US&R task forces 
on deployments. The proposed new strategy should include a mechanism for sharing 
deployment information and lessons learned between teams. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF THIS PROJECT 
While this thesis seeks to answer questions related to using the FEMA US&R 
resources more effectively, and a new strategy has been proposed, the components of the 
strategy and their effectiveness will only truly be tested in response to a large-scale 
disaster. As a new framework for catastrophic incident search and rescue emerges—many 
questions remain, such as: 
1. Can elements of FEMA US&R be integrated into military disaster 
response? 
2. How can the U.S. benefit from International Responses by FEMA US&R? 
3. Are there lessons to be learned from other jurisdictions in the way they 
utilize their Search and Rescue components? 
4. Is it cost effective or cost prohibitive to utilize our FEMA Urban Search 
and Rescue Teams for other roles in disasters? 
5. What improvements could be recognized by the FEMA US&R teams by 
adding members to the teams from disciplines outside the fire service? 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
This paper found that the original model for the National US&R Response System 
has become outdated, gaps have been exposed, and new strategies are needed in order for 
the FEMA US&R teams to be used more effectively and efficiently in the Homeland 
Security Enterprise. The latest evolution of the US&R task forces is an adaptable multi-
hazard search and rescue resource. Although the teams have been largely effective in 
search and rescue operations, the return on investment for the national US&R program is 
limited because the Federal Emergency Management Agency has not employed a more 
contemporary and versatile US&R strategy that provides for deepened coordination, 
collaboration, and training with other federal search and rescue-capable organizations. 
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The FEMA US&R task force concept appeared to be an effective model between 
its inception in 1989 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Although there was a shift to all-
hazard response—and FEMA leadership recognized the need to consider US&R in water 
inundated environments—the Katrina event was the first time the US&R teams were 
placed in an environment where the lines between search and rescue responsibilities as 
delineated in ESF-9 were revealed to be an ineffective policy. Following the Katrina 
event in September of 2005, President George Bush asked Congress to provide a larger 
role for U.S. armed forces in responding to natural disasters when he said, "Clearly, in the 
case of a terrorist attack, that would be the case, but is there a natural disaster—of a 
certain size—that would then enable the Defense Department to become the lead agency 
in coordinating and leading the response effort?"262  In making his remarks, Bush was 
asking Congress to consider a major change, where in essence they would be shifting 
federal responsibility for major natural disasters from the Department of Homeland 
Security to the nation's top military generals. This was a wake-up call for both agencies 
in that disaster response is a major component of DHS under FEMA that they are 
reluctant to give up. Also, DoD was hesitant to take such a role because of its role in 
homeland defense and because of strains on the armed forces when engaged in military 
conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Even while President Bush was making his 
comments back in 2005, a DHS spokesman was suggesting DoD as a choice to augment 
and support FEMA US&R in events where they are overwhelmed.263  The solution has 
been for these two agencies to begin cooperating and collaborating in disaster response, 
including search and rescue. 
This project also found the National US&R Response System has recently created 
a robust strategic planning process that seeks to implement many of the components of 
this paper’s proposed new National US&R strategy. In testimony before the United States 
House of Representatives several years ago, FEMA US&R Branch Chief Fred Endrikat 
stated that the numerous and complex responses have “increased the urgency for us to 
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continue to improve our skills.”264 The National US&R Response System would seem to 
be moving in that direction, but new strategies, policies, and recommendations—without 
political support, funding, and buy-in from the stakeholders—is ultimately just rhetoric.  
Katrina taught us that we were not prepared in many ways for a mega-disaster and 
that the potential remains for future catastrophes on an equal or larger scale. In the fall of 
2005, a piece in the New York Times offered a grim opinion on future disasters. 
With the global population now at six billion, humans are living in urban 
concentrations in an unprecedented number of seismically, climatically 
and environmentally fragile areas. The earthquake-stricken region of 
Pakistan saw a doubling of its population in recent decades, certainly a 
factor in the death toll of more than 20,000. The tsunami in Asia last 
December showed the risks to the rapidly growing cities along the Indian 
Ocean. China's booming population occupies flood zones. Closer to home, 
cities like Memphis and St. Louis lie along the New Madrid fault line, 
responsible for a major earthquake nearly 200 years ago when those cities 
barely existed; and the hurricane zone along the southern Atlantic Coast 
and earthquake-prone areas of California continue to be developed. More 
human beings are going to be killed or made homeless by Mother Nature 
than ever in history.265 
Recent statistics show that in 2011, more than 330 natural disasters were 
registered and—although this is less than the average annual disaster frequency of 384 
that was observed from 2001 to 2010—the human and economic impacts of the disasters 
in 2011 were massive. Natural disasters killed a total of 30,773 people and caused 
injuries to more than 244 million victims worldwide.  The losses from natural disasters 
were the highest ever registered, with an estimated $366.1 billion in economic damages. 
Further, the top five countries that are most frequently hit by natural disasters over the 
past decade are China, the United States, the Philippines, India, and Indonesia.266 
                                                 
264 Fred Endrikat, “Assessing the Capabilities and Coordination of Federal Emergency Response 
Teams,” Testimony before the United States House of Representatives. Washington, DC: U.S. House of 
Representatives (2007). 
265 Robert D. Kaplan, “Next: A War Against Nature” NY Times (October 12, 2005), A23.  
266 Debby Guha-Sapir, Femke Vos, Regina Below, Sylvain Ponserre “Annual Disaster Statistical 
Review 2011: The numbers and trends,” Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2012), 1. 
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For elements of the FEMA National Urban Search and Rescue Response System 
to rise to this challenge, they must first take the lessons learned from the failed Katrina 
response and the seemingly effective strategies from the Irene response, and then 
implement and institutionalize an updated strategy that incorporates the components 
recommended in this paper. The components of this contemporary new search and rescue 
strategy will allow other disciplines be integrated with the US&R task forces to improve 
their mission capabilities in the disaster arena. Coupled with a refined and broadened core 
mission and other subtle policy adjustments, this strategy will facilitate more effective 
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